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| id ▲ | name | unit | description | createdAt | updatedAt | code | coverage | timespan | datasetId | sourceId | shortUnit | display | columnOrder | originalMetadata | grapherConfigAdmin | shortName | catalogPath | dimensions | schemaVersion | processingLevel | processingLog | titlePublic | titleVariant | attributionShort | attribution | descriptionShort | descriptionFromProducer | descriptionKey | descriptionProcessing | licenses | license | grapherConfigETL | type | sort | dataChecksum | metadataChecksum |
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| 165482 | Campus integrity | To what extent are campuses free from politically motivated surveillance or security infringements? 0: Completely restricted. Campus integrity is fundamentally undermined by extensive surveillance and severe intimidation, including violence or closures.1: Severely restricted. Campus integrity is to a large extent undermined by surveillance and intimidation, at times including violence or closures.2: Moderately restricted. Campus integrity is challenged by some significant cases of surveillance or intimidation.3: Mostly free. Campus integrity is to a large extent respected, with only minor cases of surveillance or intimidation.4: Fully free. Campus integrity is comprehensively respected; there are no cases of surveillance or intimidation. “Campus” refers to all university buildings as well as digital research and teaching platforms. Campus integrity means the preservation of an open learning and research environment marked by an absence of an externally induced climate of insecurity or intimidation on campus. Examples of infringements of campus integrity are politically motivated on-campus or digital surveillance, presence by intelligence or security forces, presence of student militias, or violent attacks by third parties, if specifically targeting universities to repress academic life on campus. Note that we are only interested in politically motivated infringements and targeted attacks on campus integrity, not in non-political security concerns or proportionate security measures taken on campus to address these. | 2021-08-12 11:31:03 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
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| 165481 | Percentage of population with suffrage | % | What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections? Percent. This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, being in the military service or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100. Universal male suffrage is only coded as 50. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence'), estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and --- in the case of very poor information --- the conditions in similar countries or colonies. The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted. In Version 3 of the dataset this variable was re-coded from scratch based on the modified criteria reflected in the clarification section (above). Source: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); IDEA; Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); country-specific sources. | 2021-08-12 11:31:03 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | % | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165480 | Institutionalized autocracy | Is the polity an institutionalized autocracy? Numeric. Autocracy is defined operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website. Source: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020). | 2021-08-12 11:31:03 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165479 | Local offices relative power | How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level? 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level. 1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level. 2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level. 3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level. 4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level. We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to each other, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government. Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.) An office is ''subordinate'' if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office. | 2021-08-12 11:31:03 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165478 | Academic Freedom Index | To what extent is academic freedom respected? Academic freedom is understood as the right of academics, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies (UNESCO 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel). The Academic Freedom Index is designed to provide an aggregated measure that captures the de facto realization of academic freedom, including the degree to which higher-education institutions are autonomous. The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom to research and teach (v2cafres), freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch), institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut), campus integrity (v2casurv), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree). Source: v2cafres v2cafexch v2cainsaut v2casurv v2clacfree | 2021-08-12 11:31:03 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165477 | International legal commitment to academic freedom under ICESCR | Is the state party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) without reservations to article 15 (right to science)? 0: State not a party to ICESCR, or made reservations to article 15. 1: State is party to ICESCR without reservations to article 15, but treaty not yet in force. 2: ICESCR in force and signed without reservations to article 15. 3: ICESCR in force and ratified without reservations to article 15. This indicator captures the country’s international legal commitment to academic freedom. It indicates whether the country is party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights without having made explicit reservations to its article 15 (right to science), which stipulates, among other things, that states parties “undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research”. Coded is the ratification status as of December 31st of each year. Source: treaties.un.org. | 2021-08-12 11:31:03 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
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| 165476 | Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location | Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of their rural or urban locations? 0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 5 to 10% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54) | 2021-08-12 11:31:03 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165475 | Access to state jobs by political group | Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their association with a political group? 0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation, 75% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation, 25% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 10 to 25% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 5 to 10% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, less than 5% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. | 2021-08-12 11:31:03 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165474 | Access to state jobs by urban-rural location | Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their rural or urban location? 0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25 or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54) | 2021-08-12 11:31:03 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165473 | Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location | Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across urban and rural areas? 0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 5: Rural-Bias: Because they live in urban areas, 25 or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54). This question asks if geographic group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between urban and rural areas, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a geographic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165472 | Access to public services distributed by political group | Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across political groups? 0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation only 5 to 10% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. This question asks if political group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular political groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a political group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165471 | Access to state business opportunities by political group | Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of an individual’s association with a political group? 0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 5 to 10% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5% of the population, even if qualified, lack equal access to state business opportunities. State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of access to power. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165470 | Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position | Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to socioeconomic position? 0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, 25% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. This question asks if socio-economic position is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular socio-economic position, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a socio-economic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
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| 165469 | Male suffrage | % | What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised male adults older than the minimal voting age? Percent. This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers de facto enfranchised adults and not de jure. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x_elecreg), v2msuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100. Source: Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x_elecreg. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | % | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165467 | Access to public services distributed by gender | Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to gender? 0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75% or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality. 1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25% or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25% of women lack access to basic public services of good quality. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10% of women lack access to basic public services of good quality. 4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5% of women lack access to basic public services of good quality. This question asks if gender is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between gender, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that women are denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165466 | Existence of universities | Have universities existed in this country? 0: No.1: Yes. This indicator captures if universities have (ever) existed in this country. Thus, even if all universities were temporarily closed in a given year, this indicator is coded as 1 (“yes”). Country-specific sources were consulted where 4icu.org and whed.net suggested conflicting years of establishment of first university. Source: Apfeld (2019) drawing on 4icu.org (Atuzzo 2019); whed.net; various country-specific sources. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
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| 165463 | Access to public services distributed by social group | Are basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across social groups? 0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, only 5 to 10% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. 4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5% of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality. This question asks if social group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular social groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a social group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165462 | Regime corruption | To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain? In systems of neopatrimonial rule, politicians use their offices for private and/or political gain. This index relates closely to V-Dem's political corruption index (v2x_corr), but focuses on a more specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices - and a more specific set of corrupt acts that relate more closely to the conceptualization of corruption in literature on neopatrimonial rule. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better. The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more regime corruption) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive executive embezzlement (v2exembez), executive bribes (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2xlgcrrpt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). Source: v2exembez v2exbribe v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165461 | Clientelism Index | To what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships? Clientelistic relationships include the targeted, contingent distribution of resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better. The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more clientelism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote-buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps) and whether party linkages are programmatic or clientelistic (v2psprlnks). Source: v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2x_elecreg | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165459 | Election HOG turnover ordinal | Was there turnover in the office of the head of government (HOG) as a result of this national election? 0: No. The head of government- retained his/her position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOG. 1: Half. The head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership. 2: Yes. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. This code also applies if this is the first head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country. Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. If the HOS and HOG are the same person, the coding is the same for the two variables. The second round of election is coded as the first. Source: Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; V-Dem Country Coordinators. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
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| 165458 | Institutional autonomy | To what extent do universities exercise institutional autonomy in practice? 0: No autonomy at all. Universities do not exercise any degree of institutional autonomy; non-academic actors control decision-making.1: Minimal autonomy. Universities exercise only very limited institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere extensively with decision-making.2: Moderate autonomy. Universities exercise some institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere moderately with decision-making.3: Substantial autonomy. Universities exercise institutional autonomy to a large extent; non-academic actors have only rare and minimal influence on decision-making.4: Complete autonomy. Universities exercise complete institutional autonomy from non-academic actors. Institutional autonomy “means the independence of institutions of higher education from the State and all other forces of society, to make decisions regarding its internal government, finance, administration, and to establish its policies of education, research, extension work and other related activities” (Lima Declaration). Note that institutional autonomy does not preclude universities from accepting state or third party funding, but does require that they remain in charge of all types of decisions listed above. Institutional autonomy does also not preclude a public oversight role by the state over universities’ spending of public funds. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
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| 165457 | Freedom to research and teach | To what extent are scholars free to develop and pursue their own research and teaching agendas without interference? 0: Completely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, across all disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.1: Severely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, in some disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.2: Moderately restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are occasionally subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.3: Mostly free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are rarely subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.4: Fully free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are not subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor. Examples of interference include research agendas or teaching curricula being drafted, restricted, or fully censored by a non-academic actor; scholars being externally induced, through possible reprisals, to self-censor; or the university administration abusing its position of power to impose research or teaching agendas on individual academics. It also includes public pressure on academics - offline and online. We do not consider as interference restrictions that are due to research priorities, as well as ethical and quality standards, freely defined by the scholarly community as well as the development of standardized curricula by academics that aim to structure and enhance teaching. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
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| 165455 | Regional offices relative power | How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level? 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level. 1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level. 2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level. 3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level. 4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level. We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, not the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government. Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.) An office is ''subordinate'' if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165454 | Political group equality in respect for civil liberties | Do members of all political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position? 0: Some political groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than other political groups. 1: Some political groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than other political groups. 2: Some political groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than other political groups. 3: Some political groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than other political groups. 4: All political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of enjoyment of civil liberties. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165453 | Gender equality in respect for civil liberties | Do women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men? 0: Women enjoy much fewer civil liberties than men.1: Women enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than men.2: Women enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than men.3: Women enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than men.4: Women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165452 | HOG term length by law | What is the maximum term length of the head of government? Numeric 0: Term length not specified 99: Not Applicable 100: Term length is explicitly unlimited or the life of the office holder. Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation. Source: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v126. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165451 | Election other voting irregularities | In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud? 0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities. 1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country. 2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups. 3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation. 4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred. Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions). | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165450 | Upper chamber introduces bills | By law, does the upper chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions? 0: No, there are policy areas in which the upper chamber cannot introduce bills. 1: Yes. Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012). Source: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
"numDecimalPlaces": 0
} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165449 | Total number of universities | What is the total number of universities? Numeric The total number of universities founded in or before the given year. Universities are considered to be degree-granting institutions of higher education that grant at least one bachelor's degree or its equivalent, corresponding to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 6-8. Source: Apfeld (2019) | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165448 | Representation of disadvantaged social groups binary | Are there disadvantaged groups in the society? 0: No.1: Yes. Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165447 | Citizenship laws | Are there laws specifying who is a citizen and who is not and establishing procedures for naturalization? 0. No.1. Yes. Source: CCP (v543); http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/; various country-specific sources. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
"numDecimalPlaces": 0
} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165446 | Corruption perception index | The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The data spans 2012--present due to the methodological incomparability with the data prior 2012. Source: Transparency International (2018). | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165445 | Obligatory referendum administrative threshold | % | What percentage of subnational districts (e.g., cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an obligatory referendum to be approved? Percent. Enter 0 if there is no threshold. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | % | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165444 | GDP per capita, logged, base 10 | What is the GDP per capita, transformed by the natural logarithm? Source: The Maddison Project Database (2018) | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165443 | Secondary school enrollment | % | What percentage of the secondary school-aged population is enrolled in secondary school? This is based on Barro and Lee’s (2016) long-term data on secondary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals. Source: Barro and Lee Long--Run Enrollment Ratios by Country. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | % | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165442 | Armed conflict, international | Did the country participate in an international armed conflict? Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1. Source: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001). | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165441 | Party age second largest | How many years have passed since the party that holds the second most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed? 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party. Source: http://countrystudies.us | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165440 | Upper chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter | % | In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round? Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed. Source: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | % | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165439 | Monitors refuse to be present | Did any monitors refuse to go to an election because they believed that it would not be free and fair? 0: No/Unclear 1: Yes Source: NELDA 49 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); websites of election monitors. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165435 | HOG appointed by legislature | Is the head of government HOG appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state? 0: No. 1: Yes. Source: v2expathhg v2exaphogp | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
"numDecimalPlaces": 0
} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165434 | Executive corruption index | How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better. We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: executive bribery (v2exbribe) and executive embezzlement (v2exembez). Source: v2exbribe v2exembez | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165433 | Women civil liberties index | Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives? Women's civil liberties are understood to include freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), and access to justice for women (v2clacjstw). Source: v2cldmovew v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165432 | Lower chamber electoral system --- 13 categories | What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature? 0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat. 1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold --- usually 50 + 1 --- is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected. If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50 +1 of the votes.3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (i.e., a plurality) wins all the seats in that district. 5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent. 6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, t… | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165431 | Legislative or constituent assembly election | Did a legislative or constituent assembly election take place this year? 0: No. 1: Yes. In the country-date data set v2xel_elecparl is coded only on the specific election date. Source: v2eltype_0 v2eltype_1 v2eltype_4 v2eltype_5 | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
"numDecimalPlaces": 0
} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165430 | Minimum voting age presidency | What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for presidential elections? Leave blank if there are no presidential elections. Source: Caramani (2000); Flora et al. (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165429 | HOG selection by legislature in practice | Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government? 0: No 1: Yes By ''approval'' we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of government has to have majority support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment. Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded. Source: V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
"numDecimalPlaces": 0
} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165428 | Access to state business opportunities by gender | Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of gender? 0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75% or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25% or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25% of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10% of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 4: Equal. Because of their gender, 5% of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165427 | Election domestic election monitors | In this national election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country? 0: No 1: Yes | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
"numDecimalPlaces": 0
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0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165426 | Coups d'etat | Did a coup d'etat occur? 0: No coup attempt occurred 1: Unssuccessful coup attempt occurred 2: Successful coup attempt occurred Coups d’etat are defined as “overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means(…)there is no minimal death threshold for defining a coup. A coup attempt is defined as successful if the coup perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days” (Powell & Thyne 2011:252). Source: Powell and Thyne (2011) | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165425 | Election losers accept results | Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months? 0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned. 1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not. 2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant. 3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support. 4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165424 | Election paid interest group media | In this election, were interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media? 0: Not at all. 1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the government. 2: It is permitted without limit. 3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165423 | Election free and fair | Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair? 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above). 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above). 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. The only thing that should not be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately). | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165422 | Candidate selection-national/local | How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties? 0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders. 1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations. 2:National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization. 3:National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups. 4:National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors. 5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries. The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165421 | Relative power of the HOG | Does the head of government HOG have more relative power than the head of state HOS over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers? 0: No.0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.0.75: See notes.1: Yes. The relative power of the HOG is simply 1- v2ex_hosw. If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex_hogw is 1.From 1900-01-01 to 1960-08-09 Belgium has a score of 0.75. Source: v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165420 | HOG appointment in practice | How did the head of government gain access to office? 0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion. 1: Appointed by a foreign power. 2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system). 3: Appointed by a royal council. 4: Through hereditary succession. 5: Appointed by the military. 6: Appointed by the head of state. 7: Appointed by the legislature. 8: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage). 9: Other. If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 8 should only be selected if the head of government is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded. Source: V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165419 | HOS selection by legislature in practice | Was approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state? 0: No. 1: Yes. By ''approval'' we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of state has to have majority support (or should not be opposed by the majority) in the legislature even though no vote is taken on his/her appointment. We are not concerned with certification of electoral college votes (as in the US, Mexico). Converted from (B) to (A) coding. Source: V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
"numDecimalPlaces": 0
} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165418 | Access to state business opportunities by social group | Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of social group? 0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, 5 to 10% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. 4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities. State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165417 | Public sector theft | How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? 0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. 1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property. 2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property. 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property. 4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property. When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165416 | Power distributed by social group | Is political power distributed according to social groups? 0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another --- but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power. 4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics. A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood --- by those residing within that society --- to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165415 | Access to state jobs by social group | Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of social group? 0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.1: Unequal. Because of their social group identity, 25% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group identity, 10 to 25% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group identity, 5 to 10% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 4: Equal. Because of their social group identity, less than 5% of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165414 | Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval | Is the tacit or implicit approval of the upper chamber (alongside the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive? 0: No 1: Yes The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex_hosw, v2ex_hogw). Answer v2exapupap only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (if v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1). Source: National constitutions; Websites of national governments. | 2021-08-12 11:31:02 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
"numDecimalPlaces": 0
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0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165412 | Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties | Do those who reside in rural areas enjoy same level of civil liberties as those residing in urban areas? 0: Those who live in rural areas enjoy much fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas. 1: Those who live in rural areas enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas. 2: Those who live in rural areas enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas. 3: Those who live in rural areas enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas. 4: Residents of rural areas enjoy the same level of civil liberties as those in urban areas. 5: Residents of rural areas enjoy more civil liberties than those in urban areas. This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across geographic areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road (World Development Report, 2009: 54). Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165410 | HOS dismisses ministers in practice | If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed? 0: No. 1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature). 2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, emphi.e., so called ''constructive dismissal''). 3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence). | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165409 | Public sector corrupt exchanges | How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements? 0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time. 1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees. 2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times. 3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time. 4: No. Never, or hardly ever. When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165408 | Media bias | Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates? 0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover. 1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage. 2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate. 3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated amount of coverage to the governing party or candidates. 4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness. We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered 'more or less impartial' when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165407 | Executive embezzlement and theft | How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? 0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. 1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property. 2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property. 3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property. 4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165406 | Access to state jobs by gender | Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of gender? 0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75% or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25% or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25% of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10% of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. 4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5% of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165405 | Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges | How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements? 0: It is routine and expected. 1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive. 2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary. 3: It happens occasionally but is not expected. 4: It never, or hardly ever, happens. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165404 | HOG proposes legislation in practice | Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation? 0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills). 1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies. 2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation. By ''propose legislation'', we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165403 | Executive respects constitution | Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution? 0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences. 1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions. 2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences. 3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges. 4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165402 | HOG veto power in practice | If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed? 0: No. 1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting). 2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature). 3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority --- e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 --- of those voting). 4: Yes, with no possibility of override. By ''veto'', we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165401 | Media self-censorship | Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive? 0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough. 1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete. 2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues. 3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165400 | Harassment of journalists | Are individual journalists harassed --- i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed --- by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities? 0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur. 1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop. 2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time. 3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished. 4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165399 | HOG dismisses ministers in practice | If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed? 0: No. 1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature). 2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval , i.e., so called ''constructive dismissal''). 3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence). | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165398 | HOG appoints cabinet in practice | In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint --- or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of --- cabinet ministers? 0: No. 1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature. 2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOG controls the majority of the legislature ('tacit consent'). Moreover, by the 'legislature' in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism). | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165397 | HOG dissolution in practice | If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed? 0: No. 1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet). 2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as ''once a year'', by time point within term, such as ''not within the last sixth months of the head of government's term'', and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election). 3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By 'dissolving the legislature' we refer to the ability of the head of government to call a new election for the legislature. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165396 | HOS term length by law | What is the maximum term length of the Head of State, in years? Numeric, number of years. 0: Term length not specified in constitution. 99: Not Applicable. 100: Term length for life or there is no term length. De jure term lengths for Head of State and Head of Government, coded for each head of state and head of government as coded in v2exnamhos and v2exnamhog. In the case of a single office representing both Head of State and Head of Government, HOS is coded to the appropriate term length while HOG is coded as 99. For colonies, if there was no official local constitution, HOS/HOG is coded by their constitutional status according to the colonial power. Finally, for sovereign states lacking a constitution or having suspended their constitution, HOS/HOG is coded to 99 as not applicable for those relevant years. Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation. Source: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); National constitutions. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165395 | HOG removal by legislature in practice | If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of government from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity and without the involvement of any other agency? 0: No, under no circumstances. 1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen. 2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail. 3: Yes, most likely. The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165393 | HOS proposes legislation in practice | Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation? 0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills). 1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies. 2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation. By ''propose legislation'', we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165392 | HOS veto power in practice | If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed? 0: No. 1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting). 2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature). 3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority --- e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 --- of those voting). 4: Yes, with no possibility of override. By ''veto'', we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165390 | HOS appoints cabinet in practice | In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers? 0: No.1: Yes, combines answer categories 1 and 2 from v2exdfcbhs.2: Yes, combines answer categories 3 and 4 from v2exdfcbhs. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ('tacit consent'). Moreover, by the 'legislature' in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism). v2edfcbhs_rec is a version of v2exdfcbhs, for v2edfcbhs_rec the answer categories 1 and 2, 3 and 4 has been merged. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165389 | HOS dissolution in practice | If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed? 0: No. 1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet). 2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as ''once a year'', by time point within term, such as ''not within the last sixth months of the head of state's term'', and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election). 3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By 'dissolving the legislature' we refer to the ability of the head of state to call a new election for the legislature. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165388 | Election executive turnover ordinal | Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election? 0: No. The executive(s) --- head of state and head of government --- retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the executive. 1: Half. The head of state or head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or independent) that was in power before the election. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership, or a new independent head of government. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation after a period when one party (or independent) has held both offices, or if one of the executive office holders --- the head of state or head of government changes, while the other retains their position. 2: Yes. The executive(s) --- head of state and head of government --- lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party (or independent) than before the election. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when one party holds both the office of the head of state and head of government after a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices change in terms of person and party (or independent) in the same election. This code also applies if this is the first head of state and/or head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country. Turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. This question considers w… | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
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0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165387 | Election assume office | Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms? 0: No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by unconstitutional means. 1: Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months. 2: Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office). The question text between contemporary and historical differ in inclusion of 'within 12 months of the election'. In contemporary it is excluded while included in historical. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165386 | Election other electoral violence | In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)? 0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees. 1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily. 2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small. 3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured. 4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165385 | Election government intimidation | In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents? 0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet. 1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period. 2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated --- harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents. 3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups. 4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day. Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately). | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165384 | Internet censorship effort | Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet? 0 (1): The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content. 1 (2): The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls. 2 (3): The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues. 3 (4): The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above. Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the extent of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0). As of December 2014, the former category '0 There is no internet' is coded separately as v2mecenefibin. The variable is then rebased to zero. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165383 | CSO anti-system movements | Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements? 0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent. 1: There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime. 2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime. 3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the regime. 4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime. An anti-system opposition movement is any movement --- peaceful or armed --- that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, e.g., from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a 'movement' character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition. If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165382 | CSO women's participation | Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)? 0: Almost always. 1: Frequently. 2: About half the time. 3: Rarely. 4: Almost never. Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165381 | CSO entry and exit | To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life? 0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity. 1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity. 2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience. 3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence. 4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165380 | State authority over territory | % | Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the state have effective control? Percent. With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, e.g. where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (e.g. opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (e.g., contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the size of the territory that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (%) of the total territory that is officially part of the country. By 'officially part of the country' we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, Taiwan should not be considered a failure to control its territory by the government of the PRC. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | % | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165379 | International autonomy | Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy? 0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either de facto or de jure. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (e.g. Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (e.g. countries under German occupation during WWII). 1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called 'satellite' states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (e.g. Austria following WWII). 2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165378 | Elections multiparty | Was this national election multiparty? 0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party). 1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency. 2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained --- legally or informally. 3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory. 4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties). | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165377 | HOS removal by legislature in practice | If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of state from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity and without the involvement of any other agency? 0: No, under no circumstances. 1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen. 2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail. 3: Yes, most likely. The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165375 | HOS female | What is the gender of the head of state? 0: Male 1: Female If the head of state is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female. Source: worldstatesman.org; Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007). | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
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0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165374 | Initiatives administrative threshold | % | What percentage of subnational districts (e.g., cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an initiative to be approved? Percent. Enter 0 if there is no threshold. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | % | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165373 | Plebiscites super majority | % | What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a plebiscite? Percent. For 2/3, enter 66 . Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | % | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165372 | Fraud allegations by Western monitors | Were there allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors? 0: No/Unclear 1: Yes If there were no Western monitors, or no international monitors, this variable is coded as missing. Source: NELDA 47 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by Western election monitors. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165371 | Lower chamber elected | % | What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections? Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (e.g., ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, e.g., by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10 of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90. We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators. Source: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | % | {} |
0 | {} |
1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165370 | Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate | Does the national-level quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature contain a placement mandate? 0: No. 1: Yes. A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually to ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example would a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present. Source: QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2017); Coding by project manager. | 2021-08-12 11:31:01 | 2023-06-15 05:05:42 | V-Dem Dataset Version 11.1 - V-Dem Institute 5361 | V-Dem Dataset (2021) 19977 | {
"numDecimalPlaces": 0
} |
0 | {} |
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