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id ▲ | name | description | createdAt | updatedAt | datasetId | additionalInfo | link | dataPublishedBy |
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16208 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOS dismisses ministers in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exdfdmhs\n\nShort definition: If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?\n\nLong definition: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence).\n\nResponses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature<br>).<br>2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, i.e., so called ''constructive dismissal'').<br><br>3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOS dismisses ministers in practice Indicator Code: v2exdfdmhs Short definition: If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed? Long definition: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence). Responses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature<br>).<br>2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, i.e., so called ''constructive dismissal'').<br><br>3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16207 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Subnational party control\n\nIndicator Code: v2pssunpar\n\nShort definition: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?\n\nLong definition: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.\n\nResponses: 0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.<br><br>1: In most subnational units (66%-90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.<br><br>2: In few subnational units (less than 66%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Subnational party control Indicator Code: v2pssunpar Short definition: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)? Long definition: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed. Responses: 0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.<br><br>1: In most subnational units (66%-90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.<br><br>2: In few subnational units (less than 66%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16206 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Lower chamber elected\n\nIndicator Code: v2lgello\n\nShort definition: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?\n\nLong definition: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (e.g., ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. <br>Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, e.g., by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/ regional parliaments,<br> country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10% of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 %. <br><br>We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.\n\nResponses: Percent.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Lower chamber elected Indicator Code: v2lgello Short definition: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections? Long definition: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (e.g., ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. <br>Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, e.g., by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/ regional parliaments,<br> country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10% of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 %. <br><br>We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators. Responses: Percent. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16205 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Horizontal accountability index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_horacc\n\nShort definition: To what extent is the ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved?\n\nLong definition: Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals.\n\nData release: 7-8.\n\nAggregation method: We capture the extent to which the judiciary, the legislature and other oversight agencies hold the government to account by modeling each of these factors as separate hierarchical nodes.<br>The judiciary node speaks to the degree to which members of the executive compromise horizontal accountability by \"unlawfully encroaching\" on the legitimate authority of the judiciary branch. To capture that we use the indicators from the V-Dem Judicial constraints on the executive index (v2x_jucon).<br>To model the degree to which a legislature facilitates horizontal accountability we model whether or not a legislature exists a dichotomized version of v2lgbicam, and legislature activities as a function of this variable. The key function of a legislature in terms of horizontal accountability is to scrutinize government officials' potential misconduct by demanding information for their policies and decisions, and taking specific actions in case of irregularities. We use as baseline the indicators from the V-Dem Legislative constraints on the executive index v2xlg_legcon: the degree to which: (1) the legislature routinely questions the executive (v2lgotovst); and (2) a legislature is likely to investigate and produce a decision unfavorable to the executive, if the latter were engaged in an illegal or unethical activity (v2lginvstp). We exclude the Legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart) as this aspect is part of Vertical accountability index.<br>Finally, we include a variable regarding the degree to which other state bodies comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman are likely to investigate and report on potential illegal or unethical activities on part of the executive (v2lgotovst).", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "L\u00fchrmann, Anna, Valeriya Mechkova, and Kyle L. Marquardt (2017). \"Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (46), 72; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Horizontal accountability index Indicator Code: v2x_horacc Short definition: To what extent is the ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved? Long definition: Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals. Data release: 7-8. Aggregation method: We capture the extent to which the judiciary, the legislature and other oversight agencies hold the government to account by modeling each of these factors as separate hierarchical nodes.<br>The judiciary node speaks to the degree to which members of the executive compromise horizontal accountability by "unlawfully encroaching" on the legitimate authority of the judiciary branch. To capture that we use the indicators from the V-Dem Judicial constraints on the executive index (v2x_jucon).<br>To model the degree to which a legislature facilitates horizontal accountability we model whether or not a legislature exists a dichotomized version of v2lgbicam, and legislature activities as a function of this variable. The key function of a legislature in terms of horizontal accountability is to scrutinize government officials' potential misconduct by demanding information for their policies and decisions, and taking specific actions in case of irregularities. We use as baseline the indicators from the V-Dem Legislative constraints on the executive index v2xlg_legcon: the degree to which: (1) the legislature routinely questions the executive (v2lgotovst); and (2) a legislature is likely to investigate and pro… | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16204 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Regimes of the world -- the RoW measure with categories for ambiguous cases\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_regime_amb\n\nShort definition: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?\n\nResponses: 0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature. <br><br>1: Closed autocracy upper bound: Same as closed autocracy, but the confidence intervals of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of electoral autocracies. <br><br>2: Electoral autocracy lower bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the confidence intervals of one or both of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of closed autocracies. <br><br>3: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy).<br><br>4: Electoral autocracy upper bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the upper bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair and multiparty elections and the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies. <br><br>5: Electoral democracy lower bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the lower bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair, or multiparty or the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies.<br><br>6: Electoral democracy: Free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal). <br><br>7: Electoral democracy upper bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index overlap the level of liberal democracies. <br><br>8: Liberal democracy lower bound: Same as liberal democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index reaches the level of electoral democracies. <br><br>9: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).\n\nData release: 8\n\nAggregation method: Same as for Regimes of the World Measure, the RoW Measure (v2x_regime) above. In order to account for ambiguity this version of the regime type index reflects the upper and lower bounds of the point estimates used to aggregate the index in intermediate categories.", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "L\u00fchrmann, Anna, Tannenberg, Marcus, and Staffan I. Lindberg (2018). \"Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes\", Politics and Governance 6(1), 1\u201318; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Regimes of the world -- the RoW measure with categories for ambiguous cases Indicator Code: v2x_regime_amb Short definition: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles? Responses: 0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature. <br><br>1: Closed autocracy upper bound: Same as closed autocracy, but the confidence intervals of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of electoral autocracies. <br><br>2: Electoral autocracy lower bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the confidence intervals of one or both of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of closed autocracies. <br><br>3: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy).<br><br>4: Electoral autocracy upper bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the upper bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair and multiparty elections and the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies. <br><br>5: Electoral democracy lower bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the lower bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair, or multiparty or the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies.<br><br>6: Electoral democracy: Free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for pe… | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16203 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Equal distribution of resources index\n\nIndicator Code: v2xeg_eqdr\n\nShort definition: How equal is the distribution of resources?\n\nLong definition: This component measures the extent to which resources --- both tangible and intangible --- are distributed in society. An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare ensure that all individuals are capable of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order for individuals to effectively exercise their rights and freedoms see, for example, Sen 1999, Maslow 1943. Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer populations to participate meaningfully Aristotle, Dahl 2006. Thus, it is necessary to include not only measures of poverty and the distribution of goods and services, but also the levels of inequality in these distributions, and the proportion of the population who are not eligible for social services i.e. means-tests, particularistic distribution, etc.. This principle also implies that social or economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most notably by Walzer 1983, who argues that overlapping \"spheres\" of inequality are particularly harmful to society. To address these overlapping \"spheres\", this component also includes measures of the distribution of power in society amongst different socio-economic groups, genders, etc.\n\nData release: 5, 7 modified: v2pepwrses, v2pepwrsoc and v2pepwrgen now form a separate subcomponent index, 8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps), Means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies (v2dlunivl), Educational equality (v2peedueq) and Health equality (v2pehealth).", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Sigman, Rachel, and Staffan I. Lindberg (2015). \"The Index of Egalitarian Democracy and its Components: V-Dem\u2019s Conceptualization and Measurement\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (22); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Equal distribution of resources index Indicator Code: v2xeg_eqdr Short definition: How equal is the distribution of resources? Long definition: This component measures the extent to which resources --- both tangible and intangible --- are distributed in society. An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare ensure that all individuals are capable of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order for individuals to effectively exercise their rights and freedoms see, for example, Sen 1999, Maslow 1943. Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer populations to participate meaningfully Aristotle, Dahl 2006. Thus, it is necessary to include not only measures of poverty and the distribution of goods and services, but also the levels of inequality in these distributions, and the proportion of the population who are not eligible for social services i.e. means-tests, particularistic distribution, etc.. This principle also implies that social or economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most notably by Walzer 1983, who argues that overlapping "spheres" of inequality are particularly harmful to society. To address these overlapping "spheres", this component also includes measures of the distribution of power in society amongst different socio-economic groups, genders, etc. Data release: 5, 7 modified: v2pepwrses, v2pepwrsoc and v2pepwrgen now form a separate subcomponent index, 8. Aggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps), Means tested vs. universalistic welfare… | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16202 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Equal protection index\n\nIndicator Code: v2xeg_eqprotec\n\nShort definition: How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?\n\nLong definition: Equal protection means that the state grants and protects rights and freedoms evenly across social groups. To achieve equal protection of rights and freedoms, the state itself must not interfere in the ability of groups to participate and it must also take action to ensure that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the actions of another group or individual.\n\nData release: 5-6, 7 modified excluding v2xcl_acjst, 8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp) and Percent of population with weaker civil liberties (v2clnlpct); reversed scale.", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Sigman, Rachel, and Staffan I. Lindberg (2015). \"The Index of Egalitarian Democracy and its Components: V-Dem\u2019s Conceptualization and Measurement\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (22); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Equal protection index Indicator Code: v2xeg_eqprotec Short definition: How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state? Long definition: Equal protection means that the state grants and protects rights and freedoms evenly across social groups. To achieve equal protection of rights and freedoms, the state itself must not interfere in the ability of groups to participate and it must also take action to ensure that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the actions of another group or individual. Data release: 5-6, 7 modified excluding v2xcl_acjst, 8. Aggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp) and Percent of population with weaker civil liberties (v2clnlpct); reversed scale. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16201 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Deliberative component index\n\nIndicator Code: v2xdl_delib\n\nShort definition: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?\n\nLong definition: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions --- as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels --- from preference formation to final decision --- among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. <br>To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: Reasoned justification (v2dlreason), Common good justification (v2dlcommon), Respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), Range of consultation (v2dlconslt), and Engaged society (v2dlengage).", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Jan Teorell (2015). \"Measuring High Level Democratic Principles using the V-Dem Data,\" V-Dem Working Paper Series 2015 (6); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Deliberative component index Indicator Code: v2xdl_delib Short definition: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved? Long definition: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions --- as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels --- from preference formation to final decision --- among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. <br>To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels. Data release: 1-8. Aggregation method: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: Reasoned justification (v2dlreason), Common good justification (v2dlcommon), Respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), Range of consultation (v2dlconslt), and Engaged society (v2dlengage). | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16200 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Local government index\n\nIndicator Code: v2xel_locelec\n\nShort definition: Are there elected local governments, and --- if so --- to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?\n\nLong definition: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\nAggregation method: First, Local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. <br>This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by Local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel_locelec is set to 0 whenever v2ellocgov is 0 <br>(there is no local government).", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Local government index Indicator Code: v2xel_locelec Short definition: Are there elected local governments, and --- if so --- to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level? Long definition: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments. Data release: 1-8. Aggregation method: First, Local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. <br>This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by Local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel_locelec is set to 0 whenever v2ellocgov is 0 <br>(there is no local government). | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16199 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Judicial constraints on the executive index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_jucon\n\nShort definition: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), Compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), Compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), High court independence (v2juhcind), and Lower court independence (v2juncind).", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Judicial constraints on the executive index Indicator Code: v2x_jucon Short definition: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion? Data release: 1-8. Aggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), Compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), Compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), High court independence (v2juhcind), and Lower court independence (v2juncind). | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16198 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Elected officials index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_elecoff\n\nShort definition: Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?\n\nLong definition: This index attempts to measure (a) whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and (b) whether the legislature, in presidential systems with a directly elected president that is also chief executive, is directly or indirectly elected. <br>Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, 'appointment' by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss.<br>This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.\n\nData release: 1-3 preliminary aggregation formula, 4-6 as v2x_accex, 7 renamed to v2x_elecoff and modified aggregation, 8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed in two steps. First, there are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected a=1 or not a=0. Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected b. If the legislature is unicameral, b is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged. Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state c1=1, otherwise 0. Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government c2=1, otherwise 0. Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state d=1 or not d=0. Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected e=1 or not e=0.<br><br>In the second step, the extent to which the legislature is elected (b) is also independently taken into account in order to penalize presidential systems with unelected legislatures, or legislatures with a large share of presidential appointees, for example.<br><br>Define hosw as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government v2exhoshog = 1, hosw = 1. If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then hosw = 1; if the reverse is true, hosw = 0. If they share equal power, hosw = 0.5. Define the weight for the head of government as hogw = 1 - hosw. The formula then is:<br><br><br><br>v2x_elecoff = & hosw \\max(a1, b c1) + hogw \\max(a d, b c1 d, e, b c2),<br><br><br><br>unless the head of state is directly elected (v2ex_elechos = 1) and the chief executive (v2ex_hosw = 1), in case of which:<br><br><br><br>v2x_elecoff = & [hosw\\max(a1, b c1) + hogw\\max(a d, b c1 d, e, b c2) + b]/2)<br><br>", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Elected officials index Indicator Code: v2x_elecoff Short definition: Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections? Long definition: This index attempts to measure (a) whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and (b) whether the legislature, in presidential systems with a directly elected president that is also chief executive, is directly or indirectly elected. <br>Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, 'appointment' by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss.<br>This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right. Data release: 1-3 preliminary aggregation formula, 4-6 as v2x_accex, 7 renamed to v2x_elecoff and modified aggregation, 8. Aggregation method: The index is formed in two steps. First, there are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected a=1 or not a=0. Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected b. If the legislature is unicameral, b is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged. Third, whether the head of state i… | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16197 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Clean elections index\n\nIndicator Code: v2xel_frefair\n\nShort definition: To what extent are elections free and fair?\n\nLong definition: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), Election voter registry (v2elrgstry), Election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), Election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), Election government intimidation (v2elintim), Election other electoral violence (v2elpeace), and Election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x_elecreg. For the US and UK, the only two countries holding national elections prior to 1789 but with their first election within our sampling period occurring only in 1790, we have backfilled this index for 1789 with the value observed in 1790.", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Clean elections index Indicator Code: v2xel_frefair Short definition: To what extent are elections free and fair? Long definition: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence. Data release: 1-8. Aggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), Election voter registry (v2elrgstry), Election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), Election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), Election government intimidation (v2elintim), Election other electoral violence (v2elpeace), and Election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x_elecreg. For the US and UK, the only two countries holding national elections prior to 1789 but with their first election within our sampling period occurring only in 1790, we have backfilled this index for 1789 with the value observed in 1790. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16196 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Share of population with suffrage\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_suffr\n\nShort definition: What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections?\n\nLong definition: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal \tde jure restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice \tde facto. The adult population as defined by statute is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. <br>Universal suffrage is coded as 100 %. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0 %. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence', estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc., secondary country-specific sources, and --- in the case of very poor information --- the conditions in similar countries or colonies.<br>The scores reflect \tde jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.\n\nResponses: Percent.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\nAggregation method: v2elsuffrage/100", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Share of population with suffrage Indicator Code: v2x_suffr Short definition: What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections? Long definition: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal de jure restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice de facto. The adult population as defined by statute is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. <br>Universal suffrage is coded as 100 %. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0 %. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence', estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc., secondary country-specific sources, and --- in the case of very poor information --- the conditions in similar countries or colonies.<br>The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted. Responses: Percent. Data release: 1-8. Aggregation method: v2elsuffrage/100 | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16195 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom of association thick index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_frassoc_thick\n\nShort definition: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?\n\nData release: 4-8. Release 1-3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x_frassoc.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Party ban (v2psparban), Barriers to parties (v2psbars), Opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), Elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit v2cseeorgs, and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x_elecreg.", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom of association thick index Indicator Code: v2x_frassoc_thick Short definition: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely? Data release: 4-8. Release 1-3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x_frassoc. Aggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Party ban (v2psparban), Barriers to parties (v2psbars), Opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), Elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit v2cseeorgs, and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x_elecreg. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16194 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_freexp_altinf\n\nShort definition: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?\n\nLong definition: This index includes all variables in the two indices v2x_freexp and v2xme_altinf.\n\nData release: 4-8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Media censorship effort (v2mecenefm), Harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), Media bias (v2mebias), Media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), Print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and Print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange), Freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), and Freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index Indicator Code: v2x_freexp_altinf Short definition: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression? Long definition: This index includes all variables in the two indices v2x_freexp and v2xme_altinf. Data release: 4-8. Aggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Media censorship effort (v2mecenefm), Harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), Media bias (v2mebias), Media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), Print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and Print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange), Freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), and Freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree). | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16193 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Additive polyarchy index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_api\n\nShort definition: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?\n\nLong definition: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.\n\nData release: 6-8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is operationalized by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring Freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), Clean elections (v2xel_frefair), Freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), Elected executive (v2x_elecoff), and Suffrage (v2x_suffr)<br>. The weights are constructed so as to sum to 1 and weigh elected executive and suffrage half as much as the other three, respectively. <br>The index is aggregated using this formula: <br> v2x_api = (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf + (1/8) * v2x_elecoff +( 1/8) * v2x_suffr", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Teorell, Jan, Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Staffan I. Lindberg (2016). \"Measuring Electoral Democracy with V-Dem Data: Introducing a New Polyarchy Index,\" V-Dem Working Paper Series 2016(25); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Additive polyarchy index Indicator Code: v2x_api Short definition: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved? Long definition: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections. Data release: 6-8. Aggregation method: The index is operationalized by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring Freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), Clean elections (v2xel_frefair), Freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), Elected executive (v2x_elecoff), and Suffrage (v2x_suffr)<br>. The weights are constructed so as to sum to 1 and weigh elected executive and suffrage half as much as the other three, respectively. <br>The index is aggregated using this formula: <br> v2x_api = (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf + (1/8) * v2x_elecoff +( 1/8) * v2x_suffr | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16192 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Deliberative democracy index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_delibdem\n\nShort definition: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?\n\nLong definition: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions --- as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels --- from preference formation to final decision --- among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.\n\nData release: 4-8. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.\n\nAggregation method: The index is aggregated using this formula: <br>v2x_ delibdem =<br>.25* v2x_polyarchy^1.585 + .25* v2x_ delib + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.585* v2x_ delib", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Jan Teorell (2015). \"Measuring High Level Democratic Principles using the V-Dem Data,\" V-Dem Working Paper Series 2015 (6); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Deliberative democracy index Indicator Code: v2x_delibdem Short definition: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved? Long definition: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions --- as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels --- from preference formation to final decision --- among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account. Data release: 4-8. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula. Aggregation method: The index is aggregated using this formula: <br>v2x_ delibdem =<br>.25* v2x_polyarchy^1.585 + .25* v2x_ delib + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.585* v2x_ delib | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16191 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Electoral democracy index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_polyarchy\n\nShort definition: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?\n\nLong definition: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy --- liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.\n\nData release: 6-8. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring Freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), Clean elections (v2xel_frefair), Freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), Elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and Suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial 'compensation' in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the 'weakest link' argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's sub-components with the one exception of the non-electoral component. The index is aggregated using this formula: <br><br>v2x_polyarchy = & .5 * MPI + .5 * API <br>& = .5 * (v2x_elecoff * v2xel_frefair * v2x_frassoc_thick * <br>& v2x_suffr * v2x_freexp_altinf) <br>& + .5 * ((1/8) * v2x_elecoff + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair <br>& + (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/8) * v2x_suffr <br>& + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf)<br><br>", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Teorell, Jan, Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Staffan I. Lindberg (2016). \"Measuring Electoral Democracy with V-Dem Data: Introducing a New Polyarchy Index,\" V-Dem Working Paper Series 2016(25); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Electoral democracy index Indicator Code: v2x_polyarchy Short definition: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved? Long definition: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy --- liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other. Data release: 6-8. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula. Aggregation method: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring Freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), Clean elections (v2xel_frefair), Freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), Elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and Suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial 'compensation' in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the 'weakest link' argument. The aggregation is done at the… | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16190 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Participatory democracy index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_partipdem\n\nShort definition: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?\n\nLong definition: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.\n\nData release: 4-8. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.\n\nAggregation method: The index is aggregated using this formula: <br>v2x_ partipdem =<br>.25* v2x_polyarchy^1.585 + .25* v2x_ partip + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.585* v2x_ partip", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Jan Teorell (2015). \"Measuring High Level Democratic Principles using the V-Dem Data,\" V-Dem Working Paper Series 2015 (6); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Participatory democracy index Indicator Code: v2x_partipdem Short definition: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved? Long definition: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account. Data release: 4-8. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula. Aggregation method: The index is aggregated using this formula: <br>v2x_ partipdem =<br>.25* v2x_polyarchy^1.585 + .25* v2x_ partip + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.585* v2x_ partip | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16189 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Egalitarian democracy index\n\nIndicator Code: v2x_egaldem\n\nShort definition: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?\n\nLong definition: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; 3 groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.\n\nData release: 5-8. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.\n\nAggregation method: The index is aggregated using this formula: <br> v2x_ egaldem =<br>.25* v2x_polyarchy^1.585 + .25* v2x_ egal + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.585* v2x_ egal", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Sigman, Rachel, and Staffan I. Lindberg (2015). \"The Index of Egalitarian Democracy and its Components: V-Dem\u2019s Conceptualization and Measurement\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (22); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Egalitarian democracy index Indicator Code: v2x_egaldem Short definition: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved? Long definition: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; 3 groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account. Data release: 5-8. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula. Aggregation method: The index is aggregated using this formula: <br> v2x_ egaldem =<br>.25* v2x_polyarchy^1.585 + .25* v2x_ egal + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.585* v2x_ egal | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16188 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Subnational elections held\n\nIndicator Code: v2elffelrbin\n\nShort definition: Are subnational elections held?\n\nResponses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes.\n\nData release: 3-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Subnational elections held Indicator Code: v2elffelrbin Short definition: Are subnational elections held? Responses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes. Data release: 3-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16187 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Common good\n\nIndicator Code: v2dlcommon\n\nShort definition: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?\n\nLong definition: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.\n\nResponses: 0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.<br>1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.<br>2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.<br>3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.<br>4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Common good Indicator Code: v2dlcommon Short definition: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good? Long definition: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders. Responses: 0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.<br>1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.<br>2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.<br>3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.<br>4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16186 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Social class equality in respect for civil liberty\n\nIndicator Code: v2clacjust\n\nShort definition: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?\n\nLong definition: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.\n\nResponses: 0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people. <br>1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people. <br>2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.<br>3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people. <br>4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Social class equality in respect for civil liberty Indicator Code: v2clacjust Short definition: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do? Long definition: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor. Responses: 0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people. <br>1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people. <br>2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.<br>3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people. <br>4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16185 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Judicial corruption decision\n\nIndicator Code: v2jucorrdc\n\nShort definition: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?\n\nResponses: 0: Always.<br>1: Usually.<br>2: About half of the time.<br>3: Not usually.<br>4: Never.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Judicial corruption decision Indicator Code: v2jucorrdc Short definition: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision? Responses: 0: Always.<br>1: Usually.<br>2: About half of the time.<br>3: Not usually.<br>4: Never. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16184 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Judicial reform\n\nIndicator Code: v2jureform\n\nShort definition: Were the judiciary's formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?\n\nLong definition: Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power.\n\nResponses: 0: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was reduced via institutional reform. <br>1: There was no change to the judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review. <br>2: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was enhanced via institutional reform.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Judicial reform Indicator Code: v2jureform Short definition: Were the judiciary's formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority? Long definition: Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power. Responses: 0: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was reduced via institutional reform. <br>1: There was no change to the judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review. <br>2: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was enhanced via institutional reform. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16183 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Election free and fair\n\nIndicator Code: v2elfrfair\n\nShort definition: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?\n\nLong definition: The only thing that should not be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).\n\nResponses: 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). <br>1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority).<br>2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).<br>3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).<br>4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Election free and fair Indicator Code: v2elfrfair Short definition: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair? Long definition: The only thing that should not be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately). Responses: 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). <br>1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority).<br>2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).<br>3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).<br>4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16182 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom of discussion for women\n\nIndicator Code: v2cldiscw\n\nShort definition: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?\n\nLong definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely low --- rights to freedom of discussion.\n\nResponses: 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.<br>1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.<br>2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.<br>3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.<br>4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom of discussion for women Indicator Code: v2cldiscw Short definition: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? Long definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely low --- rights to freedom of discussion. Responses: 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.<br>1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.<br>2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.<br>3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.<br>4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16181 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Barriers to parties\n\nIndicator Code: v2psbars\n\nShort definition: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?\n\nLong definition: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.\n\nResponses: 0: Parties are not allowed.<br>1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally). <br>2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).<br>3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).<br>4: There are no substantial barriers.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Barriers to parties Indicator Code: v2psbars Short definition: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party? Long definition: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment. Responses: 0: Parties are not allowed.<br>1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally). <br>2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).<br>3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).<br>4: There are no substantial barriers. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16180 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Power distributed by socioeconomic position\n\nIndicator Code: v2pepwrses\n\nShort definition: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?\n\nLong definition: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.\n\nResponses: 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence. <br>1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. <br>2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.<br>3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.<br>4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Power distributed by socioeconomic position Indicator Code: v2pepwrses Short definition: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position? Long definition: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power. Responses: 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence. <br>1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. <br>2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.<br>3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.<br>4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16179 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOG removal by other in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exrmhgnp\n\nShort definition: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?\n\nLong definition: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.\n\nResponses: 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_0]<br>1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_1]<br>2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_2]<br>3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_3]<br>4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_4]<br>5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_5]<br>6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_6]<br>7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_7]<br>8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_8]\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOG removal by other in practice Indicator Code: v2exrmhgnp Short definition: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so? Long definition: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply. Responses: 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_0]<br>1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_1]<br>2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_2]<br>3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_3]<br>4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_4]<br>5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_5]<br>6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_6]<br>7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_7]<br>8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_8] Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16178 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOS removal by other in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exrmhsol\n\nShort definition: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?\n\nLong definition: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.\n\nResponses: 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_0]<br>1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_1]<br>2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_2]<br>3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_3]<br>4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_4]<br>5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_5]<br>6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_6]<br>7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_7]\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOS removal by other in practice Indicator Code: v2exrmhsol Short definition: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state if it took actions (short of military force) to do so? Long definition: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply. Responses: 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_0]<br>1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_1]<br>2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_2]<br>3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_3]<br>4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_4]<br>5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_5]<br>6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_6]<br>7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_7] Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16177 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Regional offices relative power\n\nIndicator Code: v2elrgpwr\n\nShort definition: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level?\n\nLong definition: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, not the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government. <br>Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)<br>An office is ''subordinate'' if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.\n\nResponses: 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.<br>1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.<br>2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.<br>3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.<br>4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Regional offices relative power Indicator Code: v2elrgpwr Short definition: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level? Long definition: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, not the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government. <br>Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)<br>An office is ''subordinate'' if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office. Responses: 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.<br>1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.<br>2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.<br>3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.<br>4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16176 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Party ban\n\nIndicator Code: v2psparban\n\nShort definition: Are any parties banned?\n\nLong definition: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.\n\nResponses: 0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned. <br>1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.<br>2: Yes. Many parties are banned.<br>3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.<br>4: No. No parties are officially banned.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Party ban Indicator Code: v2psparban Short definition: Are any parties banned? Long definition: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds. Responses: 0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned. <br>1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.<br>2: Yes. Many parties are banned.<br>3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.<br>4: No. No parties are officially banned. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16175 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Elections multiparty\n\nIndicator Code: v2elmulpar\n\nShort definition: Was this national election multiparty?\n\nResponses: 0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party).<br>1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.<br>2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained --- legally or informally.<br>3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.<br>4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Elections multiparty Indicator Code: v2elmulpar Short definition: Was this national election multiparty? Responses: 0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party).<br>1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.<br>2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained --- legally or informally.<br>3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.<br>4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties). Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16174 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Reasoned justification\n\nIndicator Code: v2dlreason\n\nShort definition: When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?\n\nLong definition: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.\n\nResponses: 0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, \"We must cut spending.\" <br>1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, \"We must cut spending. The state is inefficient.\" [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]<br>2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, \"We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs.\"<br>3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, \"We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation.\"\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Reasoned justification Indicator Code: v2dlreason Short definition: When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions? Long definition: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders. Responses: 0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending." <br>1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]<br>2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs."<br>3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation." Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16173 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: International autonomy\n\nIndicator Code: v2svinlaut\n\nShort definition: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?\n\nResponses: 0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either de facto or de jure. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (e.g. Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (e.g. countries under German occupation during WWII).<br>1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called ~satellite~ states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (e.g. Austria following WWII).<br>2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: International autonomy Indicator Code: v2svinlaut Short definition: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy? Responses: 0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either de facto or de jure. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (e.g. Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (e.g. countries under German occupation during WWII).<br>1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called ~satellite~ states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (e.g. Austria following WWII).<br>2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16172 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Domestic autonomy\n\nIndicator Code: v2svdomaut\n\nShort definition: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?\n\nLong definition: The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (e.g., NATO), international organizations (e.g., the WTO), or confederations (e.g., the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations.\n\nResponses: 0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power (e.g. Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (e.g., the USSR during WW II). <br>1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet ~satellite~ states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (e.g., protectorates and limited home government).<br>2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Domestic autonomy Indicator Code: v2svdomaut Short definition: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy? Long definition: The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (e.g., NATO), international organizations (e.g., the WTO), or confederations (e.g., the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations. Responses: 0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power (e.g. Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (e.g., the USSR during WW II). <br>1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet ~satellite~ states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (e.g., protectorates and limited home government).<br>2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exe… | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16171 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Social group equality in respect for civil liberties\n\nIndicator Code: v2clsocgrp\n\nShort definition: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?\n\nLong definition: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.\n\nResponses: 0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br>1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br>2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br>3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br>4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Social group equality in respect for civil liberties Indicator Code: v2clsocgrp Short definition: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position? Long definition: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor. Responses: 0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br>1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br>2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br>3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br>4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16170 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom of domestic movement for men\n\nIndicator Code: v2cldmovem\n\nShort definition: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?\n\nLong definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents. <br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely low --- freedom of movement.<br>Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.\n\nResponses: 0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea).<br>1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).<br>2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all men enjoy partial freedom of movement. <br>3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not. <br>4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom of domestic movement for men Indicator Code: v2cldmovem Short definition: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country? Long definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents. <br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely low --- freedom of movement.<br>Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest. Responses: 0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea).<br>1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).<br>2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all men enjoy partial freedom of movement. <br>3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not. <br>4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16169 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom of foreign movement\n\nIndicator Code: v2clfmove\n\nShort definition: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?\n\nLong definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.\n\nResponses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.<br>2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions. <br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.<br>4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom of foreign movement Indicator Code: v2clfmove Short definition: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration? Long definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities. Responses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.<br>2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions. <br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.<br>4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16168 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom from political killings\n\nIndicator Code: v2clkill\n\nShort definition: Is there freedom from political killings?\n\nLong definition: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).\n\nResponses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.<br>2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.<br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.<br>4: Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom from political killings Indicator Code: v2clkill Short definition: Is there freedom from political killings? Long definition: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups). Responses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.<br>2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.<br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.<br>4: Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16167 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom from torture\n\nIndicator Code: v2cltort\n\nShort definition: Is there freedom from torture?\n\nLong definition: Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (e.g., police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups).\n\nResponses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.<br>2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.<br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders. <br>4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom from torture Indicator Code: v2cltort Short definition: Is there freedom from torture? Long definition: Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (e.g., police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups). Responses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.<br>2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.<br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders. <br>4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16166 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Rigorous and impartial public administration\n\nIndicator Code: v2clrspct\n\nShort definition: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?\n\nLong definition: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination). <br>The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.\n\nResponses: 0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.<br>1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.<br>2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.<br>3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.<br>4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Rigorous and impartial public administration Indicator Code: v2clrspct Short definition: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties? Long definition: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination). <br>The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies. Responses: 0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.<br>1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.<br>2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.<br>3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.<br>4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16165 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Transparent laws with predictable enforcement\n\nIndicator Code: v2cltrnslw\n\nShort definition: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?\n\nLong definition: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.\n\nResponses: 0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.<br>1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.<br>2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.<br>3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.<br>4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Transparent laws with predictable enforcement Indicator Code: v2cltrnslw Short definition: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner? Long definition: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land. Responses: 0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.<br>1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.<br>2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.<br>3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.<br>4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16164 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom of religion\n\nIndicator Code: v2clrelig\n\nShort definition: Is there freedom of religion?\n\nLong definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.\n\nResponses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.<br>2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.<br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship. <br>4: Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom of religion Indicator Code: v2clrelig Short definition: Is there freedom of religion? Long definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities. Responses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.<br>2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.<br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship. <br>4: Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to prac… | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16163 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Access to justice for men\n\nIndicator Code: v2clacjstm\n\nShort definition: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?\n\nLong definition: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely limited --- access to justice.\n\nResponses: 0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.<br>1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected. <br>2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.<br>3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed. <br>4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Access to justice for men Indicator Code: v2clacjstm Short definition: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice? Long definition: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely limited --- access to justice. Responses: 0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.<br>1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected. <br>2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.<br>3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed. <br>4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16162 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Access to justice for women\n\nIndicator Code: v2clacjstw\n\nShort definition: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?\n\nLong definition: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely limited --- access to justice.\n\nResponses: 0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.<br>1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected. <br>2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.<br>3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed. <br>4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Access to justice for women Indicator Code: v2clacjstw Short definition: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice? Long definition: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely limited --- access to justice. Responses: 0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.<br>1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected. <br>2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.<br>3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed. <br>4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16161 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Property rights for men\n\nIndicator Code: v2clprptym\n\nShort definition: Do men enjoy the right to private property?\n\nLong definition: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and very minimal --- property rights.\n\nResponses: 0: Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind. <br>1: Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none. <br>2: Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none. <br>3: More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights. <br>4: Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not. <br>5: Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Property rights for men Indicator Code: v2clprptym Short definition: Do men enjoy the right to private property? Long definition: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and very minimal --- property rights. Responses: 0: Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind. <br>1: Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none. <br>2: Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none. <br>3: More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights. <br>4: Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not. <br>5: Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16160 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Property rights for women\n\nIndicator Code: v2clprptyw\n\nShort definition: Do women enjoy the right to private property?\n\nLong definition: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and very minimal --- property rights.\n\nResponses: 0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind. <br>1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none. <br>2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none. <br>3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights. <br>4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not. <br>5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Property rights for women Indicator Code: v2clprptyw Short definition: Do women enjoy the right to private property? Long definition: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and very minimal --- property rights. Responses: 0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind. <br>1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none. <br>2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none. <br>3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights. <br>4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not. <br>5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16159 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom from forced labor for women\n\nIndicator Code: v2clslavef\n\nShort definition: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?\n\nLong definition: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave --- not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies. <br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.\n\nResponses: 0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.<br>1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.<br>2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups. <br>3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.<br>4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom from forced labor for women Indicator Code: v2clslavef Short definition: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor? Long definition: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave --- not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies. <br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes. Responses: 0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.<br>1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.<br>2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups. <br>3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.<br>4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16158 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Range of consultation\n\nIndicator Code: v2dlconslt\n\nShort definition: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels?\n\nLong definition: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.\n\nResponses: 0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.<br>1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.<br>2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.<br>3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.<br>4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.<br>5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Range of consultation Indicator Code: v2dlconslt Short definition: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels? Long definition: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking. Responses: 0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.<br>1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.<br>2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.<br>3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.<br>4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.<br>5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16157 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Election free campaign media\n\nIndicator Code: v2elfrcamp\n\nShort definition: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media?\n\nResponses: 0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.<br>1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.<br>2: All parties receive free access.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Election free campaign media Indicator Code: v2elfrcamp Short definition: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media? Responses: 0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.<br>1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.<br>2: All parties receive free access. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16156 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: State ownership of economy\n\nIndicator Code: v2clstown\n\nShort definition: Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?\n\nLong definition: This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors. <br>It does not measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.\n\nResponses: 0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.<br>1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.<br>2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.<br>3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.<br>4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: State ownership of economy Indicator Code: v2clstown Short definition: Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy? Long definition: This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors. <br>It does not measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy. Responses: 0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.<br>1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.<br>2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.<br>3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.<br>4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16155 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom from forced labor for men\n\nIndicator Code: v2clslavem\n\nShort definition: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?\n\nLong definition: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave --- not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.\n\nResponses: 0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.<br>1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.<br>2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups. <br>3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.<br>4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom from forced labor for men Indicator Code: v2clslavem Short definition: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor? Long definition: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave --- not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies. Responses: 0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.<br>1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.<br>2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups. <br>3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.<br>4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16154 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Print/broadcast media critical\n\nIndicator Code: v2mecrit\n\nShort definition: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?\n\nResponses: 0: None.<br>1: Only a few marginal outlets.<br>2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.<br>3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Print/broadcast media critical Indicator Code: v2mecrit Short definition: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government? Responses: 0: None.<br>1: Only a few marginal outlets.<br>2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.<br>3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16153 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Internet censorship effort\n\nIndicator Code: v2mecenefi\n\nShort definition: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?\n\nLong definition: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the extent of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).\n\nResponses: 1: The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.<br>2: The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.<br>3: The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.<br>4: The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.\n\nData release: 3-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Internet censorship effort Indicator Code: v2mecenefi Short definition: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet? Long definition: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the extent of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0). Responses: 1: The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.<br>2: The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.<br>3: The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.<br>4: The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above. Data release: 3-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16152 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Equal access index\n\nIndicator Code: v2xeg_eqaccess\n\nShort definition: How equal is access to power?\n\nLong definition: The Equal Access subcomponent is based on the idea that neither the protections of rights and freedoms nor the equal distribution of resources is sufficient to ensure adequate representation. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal de facto capabilities to participate, to serve in positions of political power, to put issues on the agenda, and to influence policymaking.\n\nData release: 7-8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators Power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwrses), Power distributed by social group (v2pepwrsoc) and Power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen).", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Sigman, Rachel, and Staffan I. Lindberg (2015). \"The Index of Egalitarian Democracy and its Components: V-Dem\u2019s Conceptualization and Measurement\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (22); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Equal access index Indicator Code: v2xeg_eqaccess Short definition: How equal is access to power? Long definition: The Equal Access subcomponent is based on the idea that neither the protections of rights and freedoms nor the equal distribution of resources is sufficient to ensure adequate representation. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal de facto capabilities to participate, to serve in positions of political power, to put issues on the agenda, and to influence policymaking. Data release: 7-8. Aggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators Power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwrses), Power distributed by social group (v2pepwrsoc) and Power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen). | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16151 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Harassment of journalists\n\nIndicator Code: v2meharjrn\n\nShort definition: Are individual journalists harassed --- i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed --- by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?\n\nResponses: 0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.<br>1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.<br>2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.<br>3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.<br>4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Harassment of journalists Indicator Code: v2meharjrn Short definition: Are individual journalists harassed --- i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed --- by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities? Responses: 0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.<br>1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.<br>2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.<br>3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.<br>4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16150 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Print/broadcast media perspectives\n\nIndicator Code: v2merange\n\nShort definition: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?\n\nResponses: 0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.<br>1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.<br>2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.<br>3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Print/broadcast media perspectives Indicator Code: v2merange Short definition: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives? Responses: 0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.<br>1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.<br>2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.<br>3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16149 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Lower chamber staff\n\nIndicator Code: v2lgstafflo\n\nShort definition: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have at least one staff member with policy expertise?\n\nResponses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes.\n\nData release: 3-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Lower chamber staff Indicator Code: v2lgstafflo Short definition: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have at least one staff member with policy expertise? Responses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes. Data release: 3-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16148 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Legislature opposition parties\n\nIndicator Code: v2lgoppart\n\nShort definition: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?\n\nResponses: 0: No, not at all.<br>1: Occasionally.<br>2: Yes, for the most part.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Legislature opposition parties Indicator Code: v2lgoppart Short definition: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition? Responses: 0: No, not at all.<br>1: Occasionally.<br>2: Yes, for the most part. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16147 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Legislature controls resources\n\nIndicator Code: v2lgfunds\n\nShort definition: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?\n\nResponses: 0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive. <br>1: Yes.\n\nData release: 3-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Legislature controls resources Indicator Code: v2lgfunds Short definition: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members? Responses: 0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive. <br>1: Yes. Data release: 3-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16146 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Executive oversight\n\nIndicator Code: v2lgotovst\n\nShort definition: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?\n\nResponses: 0: Extremely unlikely.<br>1: Unlikely.<br>2: Very uncertain.<br>3: Likely.<br>4: Certain or nearly certain.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Executive oversight Indicator Code: v2lgotovst Short definition: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report? Responses: 0: Extremely unlikely.<br>1: Unlikely.<br>2: Very uncertain.<br>3: Likely.<br>4: Certain or nearly certain. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16145 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Legislature corrupt activities\n\nIndicator Code: v2lgcrrpt\n\nShort definition: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?\n\nLong definition: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.<br>Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.\n\nResponses: 0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.<br>1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.<br>2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.<br>3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.<br>4: Never, or hardly ever.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Legislature corrupt activities Indicator Code: v2lgcrrpt Short definition: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain? Long definition: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.<br>Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true. Responses: 0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.<br>1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.<br>2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.<br>3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.<br>4: Never, or hardly ever. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16144 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Representation of disadvantaged social groups\n\nIndicator Code: v2lgdsadlo\n\nShort definition: Considering all disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?\n\nLong definition: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.\n\nResponses: 1: They have no representation at all.<br>2: They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.<br>3: They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.<br>4: They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.<br>5: They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.\n\nData release: 3-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Representation of disadvantaged social groups Indicator Code: v2lgdsadlo Short definition: Considering all disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature? Long definition: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income. Responses: 1: They have no representation at all.<br>2: They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.<br>3: They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.<br>4: They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.<br>5: They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population. Data release: 3-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16143 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Lower chamber legislates in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2lglegplo\n\nShort definition: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?\n\nResponses: 0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.<br>1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.<br>2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Lower chamber legislates in practice Indicator Code: v2lglegplo Short definition: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation? Responses: 0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.<br>1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.<br>2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16142 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Lower chamber committees\n\nIndicator Code: v2lgcomslo\n\nShort definition: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?\n\nResponses: 0: No, there are no committees.<br>1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.<br>2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.<br>3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Lower chamber committees Indicator Code: v2lgcomslo Short definition: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system? Responses: 0: No, there are no committees.<br>1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.<br>2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.<br>3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16141 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Executive embezzlement and theft\n\nIndicator Code: v2exembez\n\nShort definition: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?\n\nResponses: 0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. <br>1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.<br>2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.<br>3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.<br>4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Executive embezzlement and theft Indicator Code: v2exembez Short definition: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? Responses: 0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. <br>1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.<br>2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.<br>3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.<br>4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16140 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Public sector corrupt exchanges\n\nIndicator Code: v2excrptps\n\nShort definition: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?\n\nLong definition: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.\n\nResponses: 0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.<br>1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.<br>2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.<br>3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.<br>4: No. Never, or hardly ever.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Public sector corrupt exchanges Indicator Code: v2excrptps Short definition: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements? Long definition: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response. Responses: 0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.<br>1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.<br>2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.<br>3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.<br>4: No. Never, or hardly ever. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16139 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOS appoints cabinet in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exdfcbhs\n\nShort definition: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint --- or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of --- cabinet ministers?\n\nLong definition: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature (\"tacit consent\"). Moreover, by the \"legislature\" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).\n\nResponses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.<br>2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.<br>3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.<br>4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOS appoints cabinet in practice Indicator Code: v2exdfcbhs Short definition: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint --- or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of --- cabinet ministers? Long definition: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism). Responses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.<br>2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.<br>3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.<br>4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16138 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Legislative constraints on the executive index\n\nIndicator Code: v2xlg_legcon\n\nShort definition: To what extent are the legislature and government agencies e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\nAggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), Executive oversight (v2lgotovst), Legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and Legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Legislative constraints on the executive index Indicator Code: v2xlg_legcon Short definition: To what extent are the legislature and government agencies e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive? Data release: 1-8. Aggregation method: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for Legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), Executive oversight (v2lgotovst), Legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and Legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart). | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16137 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Public sector theft\n\nIndicator Code: v2exthftps\n\nShort definition: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?\n\nLong definition: When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.\n\nResponses: 0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. <br>1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.<br>2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.<br>3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.<br>4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Public sector theft Indicator Code: v2exthftps Short definition: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? Long definition: When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response. Responses: 0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. <br>1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.<br>2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.<br>3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.<br>4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16136 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOG proposes legislation in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exdfpphg\n\nShort definition: Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?\n\nLong definition: By ''propose legislation'', we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.\n\nResponses: 0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).<br>1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.<br>2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOG proposes legislation in practice Indicator Code: v2exdfpphg Short definition: Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation? Long definition: By ''propose legislation'', we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Responses: 0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).<br>1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.<br>2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16135 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOG veto power in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exdfvthg\n\nShort definition: If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?\n\nLong definition: By ''veto'', we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.\n\nResponses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).<br>2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).<br>3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority --- e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 --- of those voting).<br>4: Yes, with no possibility of override.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOG veto power in practice Indicator Code: v2exdfvthg Short definition: If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed? Long definition: By ''veto'', we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Responses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).<br>2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).<br>3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority --- e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 --- of those voting).<br>4: Yes, with no possibility of override. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16134 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOG dismisses ministers in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exdfdshg\n\nShort definition: If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?\n\nLong definition: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence).\n\nResponses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).<br>2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval , i.e., so called ''constructive dismissal'').<br>3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOG dismisses ministers in practice Indicator Code: v2exdfdshg Short definition: If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed? Long definition: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence). Responses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).<br>2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval , i.e., so called ''constructive dismissal'').<br>3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16133 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOG appoints cabinet in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exdjcbhg\n\nShort definition: In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint --- or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of --- cabinet ministers?\n\nLong definition: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOG controls the majority of the legislature (\"tacit consent\"). Moreover, by the ~legislature~ in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).\n\nResponses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.<br>2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOG appoints cabinet in practice Indicator Code: v2exdjcbhg Short definition: In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint --- or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of --- cabinet ministers? Long definition: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOG controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the ~legislature~ in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism). Responses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.<br>2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16132 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOG dissolution in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exdjdshg\n\nShort definition: If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?\n\nLong definition: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By \"dissolving the legislature\" we refer to the ability of the head of government to call a new election for the legislature.\n\nResponses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).<br>2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as ''once a year'', by time point within term, such as ''not within the last sixth months of the head of government's term'', and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).<br>3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOG dissolution in practice Indicator Code: v2exdjdshg Short definition: If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed? Long definition: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of government to call a new election for the legislature. Responses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).<br>2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as ''once a year'', by time point within term, such as ''not within the last sixth months of the head of government's term'', and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).<br>3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16131 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOS proposes legislation in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exdfpphs\n\nShort definition: Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?\n\nLong definition: By ''propose legislation'', we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.\n\nResponses: 0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).<br>1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.<br>2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOS proposes legislation in practice Indicator Code: v2exdfpphs Short definition: Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation? Long definition: By ''propose legislation'', we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Responses: 0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).<br>1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.<br>2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16130 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: HOS veto power in practice\n\nIndicator Code: v2exdfvths\n\nShort definition: If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?\n\nLong definition: By ''veto'', we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.\n\nResponses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).<br>2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).<br>3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority --- e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 --- of those voting).<br>4: Yes, with no possibility of override.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: HOS veto power in practice Indicator Code: v2exdfvths Short definition: If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed? Long definition: By ''veto'', we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Responses: 0: No.<br>1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).<br>2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).<br>3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority --- e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 --- of those voting).<br>4: Yes, with no possibility of override. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16129 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Local offices relative power\n\nIndicator Code: v2ellocpwr\n\nShort definition: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?\n\nLong definition: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to each other, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government. <br>Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)<br>An office is ''subordinate'' if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.\n\nResponses: 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.<br>1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.<br>2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.<br>3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.<br>4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Local offices relative power Indicator Code: v2ellocpwr Short definition: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level? Long definition: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to each other, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government. <br>Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)<br>An office is ''subordinate'' if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office. Responses: 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.<br>1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.<br>2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.<br>3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.<br>4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16128 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: EMB autonomy\n\nIndicator Code: v2elembaut\n\nShort definition: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?\n\nLong definition: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.\n\nResponses: 0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body.<br>1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the de facto ruling body.<br>2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.<br>3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.<br>4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: EMB autonomy Indicator Code: v2elembaut Short definition: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections? Long definition: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections. Responses: 0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body.<br>1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the de facto ruling body.<br>2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.<br>3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.<br>4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16127 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Election losers accept results\n\nIndicator Code: v2elaccept\n\nShort definition: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?\n\nResponses: 0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.<br>1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.<br>2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.<br>3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.<br>4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Election losers accept results Indicator Code: v2elaccept Short definition: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months? Responses: 0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.<br>1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.<br>2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.<br>3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.<br>4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16126 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Election vote buying\n\nIndicator Code: v2elvotbuy\n\nShort definition: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?\n\nLong definition: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., \"porkbarrel\" legislation.\n\nResponses: 0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.<br>1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.<br>2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcentry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.<br>3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.<br>4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Election vote buying Indicator Code: v2elvotbuy Short definition: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying? Long definition: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., "porkbarrel" legislation. Responses: 0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.<br>1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.<br>2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an ‘entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.<br>3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.<br>4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16125 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Election other voting irregularities\n\nIndicator Code: v2elirreg\n\nShort definition: In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?\n\nLong definition: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).<br>Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. <br>This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions)\n\nResponses: 0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.<br>1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.<br>2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.<br>3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation. <br>4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Election other voting irregularities Indicator Code: v2elirreg Short definition: In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud? Long definition: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).<br>Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. <br>This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions) Responses: 0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.<br>1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.<br>2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.<br>3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation. <br>4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16124 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Election government intimidation\n\nIndicator Code: v2elintim\n\nShort definition: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?\n\nLong definition: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).\n\nResponses: 0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.<br>1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.<br>2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated --- harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.<br>3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups. <br>4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Election government intimidation Indicator Code: v2elintim Short definition: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents? Long definition: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately). Responses: 0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.<br>1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.<br>2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated --- harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.<br>3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups. <br>4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16123 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Election other electoral violence\n\nIndicator Code: v2elpeace\n\nShort definition: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?\n\nResponses: 0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.<br>1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.<br>2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.<br>3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.<br>4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Election other electoral violence Indicator Code: v2elpeace Short definition: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)? Responses: 0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.<br>1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.<br>2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.<br>3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.<br>4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16122 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Respect counterarguments\n\nIndicator Code: v2dlcountr\n\nShort definition: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?\n\nLong definition: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.\n\nResponses: 0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.<br>1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.<br>2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.<br>3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.<br>4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.<br>5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Respect counterarguments Indicator Code: v2dlcountr Short definition: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments? Long definition: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders. Responses: 0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.<br>1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.<br>2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.<br>3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.<br>4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.<br>5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16121 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Engaged society\n\nIndicator Code: v2dlengage\n\nShort definition: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?\n\nLong definition: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.\n\nResponses: 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.<br>1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.<br>2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.<br>3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.<br>4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.<br>5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Engaged society Indicator Code: v2dlengage Short definition: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations? Long definition: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media. Responses: 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.<br>1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.<br>2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.<br>3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.<br>4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.<br>5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16120 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom of domestic movement for women\n\nIndicator Code: v2cldmovew\n\nShort definition: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?\n\nLong definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents. <br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely low --- freedom of movement.<br>Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.\n\nResponses: 0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).<br>1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).<br>2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement. <br>3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not. <br>4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom of domestic movement for women Indicator Code: v2cldmovew Short definition: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country? Long definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents. <br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely low --- freedom of movement.<br>Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest. Responses: 0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).<br>1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).<br>2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement. <br>3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not. <br>4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16119 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Executive respects constitution\n\nIndicator Code: v2exrescon\n\nShort definition: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?\n\nResponses: 0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.<br>1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.<br>2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.<br>3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.<br>4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Executive respects constitution Indicator Code: v2exrescon Short definition: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution? Responses: 0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.<br>1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.<br>2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.<br>3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.<br>4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16118 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Representation of disadvantaged social groups binary\n\nIndicator Code: v2lgdsadlobin\n\nShort definition: Are there disadvantaged groups in the society?\n\nLong definition: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.\n\nResponses: 0: No. <br>1: Yes.\n\nData release: 3-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Representation of disadvantaged social groups binary Indicator Code: v2lgdsadlobin Short definition: Are there disadvantaged groups in the society? Long definition: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income. Responses: 0: No. <br>1: Yes. Data release: 3-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16117 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom of academic and cultural expression\n\nIndicator Code: v2clacfree\n\nShort definition: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?\n\nResponses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression. <br>2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.<br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.<br>4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom of academic and cultural expression Indicator Code: v2clacfree Short definition: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues? Responses: 0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.<br>1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression. <br>2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.<br>3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.<br>4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16116 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Government censorship effort --- Media\n\nIndicator Code: v2mecenefm\n\nShort definition: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?\n\nLong definition: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.<br>We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.\n\nResponses: 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.<br>1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.<br>2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.<br>3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.<br>4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Government censorship effort --- Media Indicator Code: v2mecenefm Short definition: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media? Long definition: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.<br>We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech. Responses: 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.<br>1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.<br>2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.<br>3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.<br>4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16115 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Freedom of discussion for men\n\nIndicator Code: v2cldiscm\n\nShort definition: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?\n\nLong definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely low --- rights to freedom of discussion.\n\nResponses: 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.<br>1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.<br>2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.<br>3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.<br>4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Freedom of discussion for men Indicator Code: v2cldiscm Short definition: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? Long definition: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.<br>This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal --- and extremely low --- rights to freedom of discussion. Responses: 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.<br>1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.<br>2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.<br>3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.<br>4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16114 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Compliance with judiciary\n\nIndicator Code: v2jucomp\n\nShort definition: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?\n\nLong definition: We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the high court. You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized courts.\n\nResponses: 0: Never.<br>1: Seldom. <br>2: About half of the time.<br>3: Usually.<br>4: Always.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Compliance with judiciary Indicator Code: v2jucomp Short definition: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees? Long definition: We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the high court. You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized courts. Responses: 0: Never.<br>1: Seldom. <br>2: About half of the time.<br>3: Usually.<br>4: Always. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16113 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Judicial purges\n\nIndicator Code: v2jupurge\n\nShort definition: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.\n\nLong definition: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (i.e., when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.\n\nResponses: 0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary. <br>1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals. <br>2: There were limited arbitrary removals.<br>3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary. <br>4: Judges were not removed from their posts.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Judicial purges Indicator Code: v2jupurge Short definition: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year. Long definition: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (i.e., when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges. Responses: 0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary. <br>1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals. <br>2: There were limited arbitrary removals.<br>3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary. <br>4: Judges were not removed from their posts. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16112 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Lower court independence\n\nIndicator Code: v2juncind\n\nShort definition: When judges not on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?\n\nResponses: 0: Always.<br>1: Usually.<br>2: About half of the time.<br>3: Seldom.<br>4: Never.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Lower court independence Indicator Code: v2juncind Short definition: When judges not on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record? Responses: 0: Always.<br>1: Usually.<br>2: About half of the time.<br>3: Seldom.<br>4: Never. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16111 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Government attacks on judiciary\n\nIndicator Code: v2jupoatck\n\nShort definition: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?\n\nLong definition: Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.\n\nResponses: 0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.<br>1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year. <br>2: Attacks occurred more than once. <br>3: There were attacks, but they were rare. <br>4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Government attacks on judiciary Indicator Code: v2jupoatck Short definition: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public? Long definition: Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches. Responses: 0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.<br>1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year. <br>2: Attacks occurred more than once. <br>3: There were attacks, but they were rare. <br>4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16110 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Party branches\n\nIndicator Code: v2psprbrch\n\nShort definition: How many parties have permanent local party branches?\n\nResponses: 0: None. <br>1: Fewer than half. <br>2: About half. <br>3: More than half. <br>4: All.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Party branches Indicator Code: v2psprbrch Short definition: How many parties have permanent local party branches? Responses: 0: None. <br>1: Fewer than half. <br>2: About half. <br>3: More than half. <br>4: All. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
16109 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 (2018) | { "link": "https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18", "additionalInfo": "This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook:\n\nIndicator Name: Party organizations\n\nIndicator Code: v2psorgs\n\nShort definition: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?\n\nLong definition: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.\n\nResponses: 0: No parties.<br>1: Fewer than half of the parties.<br>2: About half of the parties.<br>3: More than half of the parties.<br>4: All parties.\n\nData release: 1-8.\n\n", "dataPublishedBy": "V-Dem Institute", "dataPublisherSource": "Pemstein, Dan, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri (2018). \"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data\", V-Dem Working Paper Series (21); Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). \"V-Dem Codebook v8\" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerl\u00f8w, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna L\u00fchrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von R\u00f6mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstr\u00f6m, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. \"V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8\". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18" } |
2018-10-03 13:26:02 | 2018-10-03 13:26:02 | V-Dem Dataset Version 8 - V-Dem Institute 3073 | This variable was imported into the OWID database from Version 8 of the V-Dem Dataset. Here is the original metadata given by the V-Dem Codebook: Indicator Name: Party organizations Indicator Code: v2psorgs Short definition: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations? Long definition: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season. Responses: 0: No parties.<br>1: Fewer than half of the parties.<br>2: About half of the parties.<br>3: More than half of the parties.<br>4: All parties. Data release: 1-8. | https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18 | V-Dem Institute |
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CREATE TABLE "sources" ( "id" INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, "name" VARCHAR(512) NULL , "description" TEXT NOT NULL , "createdAt" DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP , "updatedAt" DATETIME NULL , "datasetId" INTEGER NULL, additionalInfo TEXT GENERATED ALWAYS as (JSON_EXTRACT(description, '$.additionalInfo')) VIRTUAL, link TEXT GENERATED ALWAYS as (JSON_EXTRACT(description, '$.link')) VIRTUAL, dataPublishedBy TEXT GENERATED ALWAYS as (JSON_EXTRACT(description, '$.dataPublishedBy')) VIRTUAL, FOREIGN KEY("datasetId") REFERENCES "datasets" ("id") ON UPDATE RESTRICT ON DELETE RESTRICT ); CREATE INDEX "sources_datasetId" ON "sources" ("datasetId");