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51701 | Shrink emissions, not the economy | shrink-emissions-not-the-economy | post | publish | <!-- wp:owid/byline --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This is a guest post by <strong>Linus Mattauch</strong><sup>1</sup>, <strong>Alexander Radebach</strong><sup>2</sup>, <strong>Jan Siegmeier</strong><sup>2</sup>, and <strong>Simona Sulikova</strong><sup>1</sup>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><sup>1</sup>Institute for New Economic Thinking, Oxford Martin School, and Environmental Change Institute, School of Geography & the Environment. University of Oxford.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><sup>2</sup>Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change Berlin.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- /wp:owid/byline --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Public debates on climate change frequently exhibit a misunderstanding – namely that decarbonisation of our economies necessarily conflicts with economic growth. Ironically, the proponents of this claim come from two antagonistic camps. On the one hand, there are those who believe that addressing climate change must take priority and that this requires an organised diminution of economic output (termed “degrowth”). On the other hand, there are those who believe that economic growth and the social stability that comes with it should be prioritised: concerning oneself with climate policy should not be a priority if it impacts competitiveness.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:heading {"level":4} --> <h4>The technological feasibility of decoupling emissions</h4> <!-- /wp:heading --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>One key distinction to elucidate the debate is between the technological and the political feasibility of “decoupling” of <a href="https://owid.cloud/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">emissions</a> from <a href="https://owid.cloud/economic-growth" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">growth</a>. Decoupling can be relative (when rates of economic growth are higher than rates of emissions growth) or absolute (when emissions fall in absolute terms even as the economy continues to grow). A further question only indirectly related to climate change mitigation is whether human well-being itself can be decoupled from economic growth.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This post focuses on the <em>technological feasibility</em> of absolute decoupling. Any cogent claim about appropriate responses to environmental problems must start with a normative benchmark, which for climate change mitigation is provided by assessments of optimal technology deployment and demand restructuring. Whether or not the optimal mix of relevant technologies is politically feasible is a different question entirely, but the two must be distinguished clearly for coherent policy advice.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Indeed much sophisticated modelling has been carried out to show that the transformation to carbon-free economies is technologically feasible.{ref}Clarke L., K. Jiang, K. Akimoto, M. Babiker, G. Blanford, K. Fisher-Vanden, J.-C. Hourcade, V. Krey, E. Kriegler, A. Löschel, D. McCollum, S. Paltsev, S. Rose, P.R. Shukla, M. Tavoni, B.C.C. van der Zwaan, and D.P. van Vuuren, 2014: Assessing Transformation Pathways. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. Available <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">online</a>.{/ref} The 2014 IPCC Report on the Mitigation of Climate Change has assessed this relevant modelling and finds that on average scenarios limiting warming to 2° C costs 0.06 percent of annual economic growth.{ref}Edenhofer et al. (2014). IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.{/ref} This is a small number compared to projections that the world economy will continue to grow at 2 percent per year, although in the order of the costs of any other major political reform. Furthermore, a substantial part of decarbonisation of the European Economy by 2030 is <em>already </em>economically cost-effective.{ref}IRENA (2018). Renewable Energy Prospects for the European Union. Available <a href="https://irena.org/publications/2018/Feb/Renewable-energy-prospects-for-the-EU" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">online</a>.{/ref}</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Global decoupling is not yet happening: Although annual global emissions have been stable in 2014-2016, they rose again in 2017.{ref}Jackson et al. (2017). <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=10.1088%2F1748-9326%2Faa9662&btnG=" target="_blank">Warning Signs for Stabilising global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions</a>.{/ref} However, it would be premature to draw conclusions about the future based on past trends.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:heading {"level":4} --> <h4>Emission-intensive sectors are only a minor part of the economy</h4> <!-- /wp:heading --> <!-- wp:columns --> <div class="wp-block-columns"><!-- wp:column --> <div class="wp-block-column"><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As shown in the charts here, our data{ref}World Input-Output Database 2013 release [Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, E., Los, B., Stehrer, R. and de Vries, G. J. (2015),"An Illustrated User Guide to the World Input–Output Database: the Case of Global Automotive Production", Review of International Economics., 23: 575–605]. Year 2009 in basic prices, value added computed as net sectoral output (gross sectoral output less sectoral input).{/ref} illustrates one major reason behind the modelling consensus that decarbonisation and economic growth are compatible: in rich countries, sectors contributing most to economic output typically do not contribute to emissions significantly. This is true across such diverse economies as the United States, Germany, and China. Further, as we show in the next section, in many sectors absolute decoupling has been happening.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --></div> <!-- /wp:column --> <!-- wp:column --> <div class="wp-block-column"><!-- wp:html --> <figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;" src="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-usa" width="300" height="150"></iframe></figure> <!-- /wp:html --> <!-- wp:html --> <figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;" src="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-germany" width="300" height="150"></iframe></figure> <!-- /wp:html --> <!-- wp:html --> <figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;" src="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-china" width="300" height="150"></iframe></figure> <!-- /wp:html --></div> <!-- /wp:column --></div> <!-- /wp:columns --> <!-- wp:heading {"level":4} --> <h4>Absolute decoupling has been happening in many economic sectors</h4> <!-- /wp:heading --> <!-- wp:columns --> <div class="wp-block-columns"><!-- wp:column --> <div class="wp-block-column"><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>So if the most powerful economic sectors are not emissions intensive, then regulating emissions need not affect economic prosperity or output in developed economies. As shown in the charts here, the virtual economy and high-skilled jobs have grown disproportionately faster than heavy industry in the recent past.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Even in China, the service sector has grown from contributing 24% to total economic output in 1995 to 33% in 2009, when most of the emissions “exported” from high to lower-income countries went to Chinese manufacturing. In the United States the service sector contribution has increased from 52% to 58% and in Germany from 50% to 55%. This growth in services has arisen mostly at the expense of heavy industry (which fell from 17.5% to 14.7% and 27% to 23%, in the USA and Germany, respectively), in addition to a fall in China's agricultural contribution. This is particularly notable in China, a country to which polluting industry has often been exported; the vast majority of all sectors have experienced much faster growth in economic output than in emissions. Thus, relative decoupling is a technical feasibility.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On the other hand, the charts in the previous section show that the sector that contributes by far the most emissions is energy and electricity generation. In Germany in 2009 it accounted for 51% of emissions and less than 3% of value added. Decarbonisation of the energy sector would thus contribute greatly to the decarbonisation of the economy without significantly affecting overall economic output, as a first approximation. Clearly, supply chains connect the growth and size of economic sectors. For instance, the digital economy requires a notable amount of electricity and material infrastructure. Yet, decarbonising the supplying sectors allows economic growth of the whole sectoral chain without a parallel growth in emissions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --></div> <!-- /wp:column --> <!-- wp:column --> <div class="wp-block-column"><!-- wp:html --> <figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;" src="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-usa" width="300" height="150"></iframe></figure> <!-- /wp:html --> <!-- wp:html --> <figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;" src="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-germany" width="300" height="150"></iframe></figure> <!-- /wp:html --> <!-- wp:html --> <figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;" src="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-china" width="300" height="150"></iframe></figure> <!-- /wp:html --></div> <!-- /wp:column --></div> <!-- /wp:columns --> <!-- wp:heading {"level":4} --> <h4>The three main arguments why growth and decarbonisation are compatible</h4> <!-- /wp:heading --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>However, is this argument about the separation of economically important and emission-intensive sectors naïve? After all, in the past, sustained economic growth has always coincided with growth in emissions. This objection is intuitive, but equates a correlation from a time with little political effort in climate protection with causation. We next revisit the main conceptual arguments behind why modelling consistently shows decarbonisation and economic growth are compatible under optimal policy.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Beyond our simple plots that disentangle value added and emissions by sector, three further arguments make the equivalence of economic output growth and increasing emissions implausible.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>First, the fast development and high deployment of renewable energy technologies has brought down their production costs so far that for the first time, deploying solar and wind renewables is cheaper, on a life-cycle cost basis, than building fossil power stations.{ref}See Lazard's <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-2017/" target="_blank">Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE)</a> Analysis, and Creutzig et al. (2017). The underestimated potential of solar energy to mitigate climate change. <em>Nature</em> Energy, <strong>2</strong>. Available <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nenergy2017140" target="_blank">online</a>.{/ref}</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Second, economies have been remarkably reactive to price signals and easily overcame substantial constraints in the past.{ref}See, for example, Beckert, S. (2004). Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War. <i>The American Historical Review,</i> <i>109</i>(5), 1405-1438. Available <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/530931?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">online</a>.{/ref} As resources become scarcer and prices increase, opportunities for substitutes arise. On an individual level, substantial price changes, even on fuel, do reduce demand.{ref}Zimmer, A., & Koch, N. (2017). Fuel consumption dynamics in Europe: Tax reform implications for air pollution and carbon emissions. <i>Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice</i>, <i>106</i>, 22-50. Available <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856416307650" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">online</a>.{/ref} One can thus be optimistic about the development of low-carbon production technologies if substantial carbon prices are put in place. Historically, higher rates of economic growth have also been correlated with higher rates of innovation.{ref}Hasan, I., & Tucci, C. L. (2010). The innovation–economic growth nexus: Global evidence. <i>Research Policy</i>, <i>39</i>(10), 1264-1276. Available online.{/ref}</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Third, low-carbon substitutes for some goods are indeed difficult to conceive at the timescales required to successfully address the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" href="http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php" target="_blank">world's climate targets</a>, including reaching carbon neutrality within the 21<sup>st</sup> century. <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://owid.cloud/meat-production" data-type="page" data-id="13015" target="_blank">Meat consumption</a> and aviation are highly emissions-intensive activities for which this is a case in point — 'artificial meat' and 'electric planes' may take too long to become marketable to achieve these goals. However, as <a href="/shrink-emissions-not-the-economy#emission-intensive-sectors-are-only-a-minor-part-of-the-economy" data-type="internal">we showed above</a>, these sectors are relatively small in terms of value added in developed economies. Therefore, reducing meat consumption and air transport, albeit partly controversial, should be feasible without large economic losses. One might go even further and question the interlinkage of consumption levels from these goods/services and societal well-being.{ref}Creutzig, F., Roy, J., Lamb, J. W. F., Azevedo, I. M. L., Bruine de Bruin, W., Dalkmann, H., Edelenbosch, O. Y., Geels, F.W., Grubler, A., Hepburn, C., Hertwich, E.G., Khosla, R., Mattauch, L.,Minx, J.C., Ramakrishnan, A., Rao, N.D., Steinberger, J.K.,Tavoni, M., Ürge-Vorsatz, D. and Weber, E.U. (2018). Towards demand-side solutions for mitigating climate change. <i>Nature Climate Change</i> 8: 268-271. Available <a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0121-1" target="_blank">online</a>.{/ref} However, the last point raises intricate questions about what really matters for quality of life and what the 'good' society looks like.{ref}Mattauch, L., Ridgway, M., & Creutzig, F. (2016). Happy or liberal? Making sense of behavior in transport policy design. <i>Transportation research part D: transport and environment</i>, <i>45</i>, 64-83. Available online.{/ref}<sup>, </sup>{ref}Mattauch, L., & Hepburn, C. (2016). Climate policy when preferences are endogenous—and sometimes they are. <i>Midwest Studies in Philosophy</i>, <i>40</i>(1), 76-95. Available online.{/ref}</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>These arguments have a significant implication for what governments should focus on in order to tackle climate change: curtail emissions in the highly emitting sectors! This can be achieved by levying a significant and reliable price on anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions – either through a tax or an emissions trading scheme. It will imply that appropriate low-carbon alternatives are developed. If done well, this can even increase productivity and create additional economic growth, as a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk/news/good-climate-policy" target="_blank">recent article</a> shows: aggregate investment is channeled from fossil resources into additional productive capital.{ref}Siegmeier, J., Mattauch, L., & Edenhofer, O. (2018). Capital beats coal: How collecting the climate rent increases aggregate investment. <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>, 88: 366—378. Available <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069617308707">online</a>.{/ref}</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Alternatively, an outright ban on the most emissions-intensive economic activities, such as burning coal, would achieve equal results in terms of emissions reductions, but forgo some of the economic benefits of decarbonizing the economy by appropriate price signals. In countries in which strong mitigation policies are in place, such as Sweden and Switzerland, emissions are declining. It is true that a portion of these reductions may be attributed to carbon leakage – <a rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions#co2-emissions-and-prosperity" target="_blank">emissions are partly outsourced</a> as <a rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://ourworldindata.org/growth-and-structural-transformation-are-emerging-economies-industrializing-too-quickly" target="_blank">production shifts</a> to poorer or less environmentally regulated countries. Yet if just a limited number of countries decarbonise, carbon leakage is only an obstacle to emission reductions as long as national economies do not impose tariffs on the carbon content of products they import.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:heading {"level":4} --> <h4>Individual responsibility and sufficiency</h4> <!-- /wp:heading --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>While society at large has better alternatives to slowing growth, this is not necessarily true at the individual level. But what should an <em>individual </em>do about climate change? While governments can target various sectors, consumers are limited to choose between already existing products. Information about emissions along the entire supply and production chain (including potential carbon leaks) are also typically lacking. Moreover, motivated individuals typically care about other dimensions of environmental sustainability, such as biodiversity and water use.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Missing information and multiple objectives make product choice by individuals a different decision-making problem. Thus, at the private level, a more general sufficiency strategy of reducing material consumption overall may be appropriate.{ref}Wynes, S., & Nicholas, K. A. (2017). The climate mitigation gap: education and government recommendations miss the most effective individual actions. <i>Environmental Research Letters</i>, <i>12</i>(7), 074024. Available <a href="http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7541">online</a>.{/ref} Nonetheless, focusing on the most emissions-intensive activities such as road and air transport or meat consumption would make a certain contribution to climate change mitigation. Reducing material throughput is also strategy applicable at the economy-wide level; an example is the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/towards-circular-economy_en" target="_blank">European Union Circular Economy policy</a><span style="font-size: 13.3333px;">.</span> However, this has the purpose of creating innovation and redesigning waste contributing to energy efficiency.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:heading {"level":4} --> <h4>Implications for climate policy</h4> <!-- /wp:heading --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>We conclude that contrasting climate protection with economic growth, as is so frequently done, is misleading. Economic growth emerges from individual instincts for improvements from billions of talented humans. Slowing down economic growth would mean suppressing that instinct, at enormous losses of individual freedom. So climate protection can only be successful by redirecting these instincts towards carbon-free production processes, creating a different sense of what is considered an improvement and, in rare cases, forgoing some benefits of irreplaceable high-carbon consumption options. Rather than emphasizing potential competitiveness concerns, debates about climate policy should focus on implementability of policy, political will and responsibility of actors, including private individuals.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> | { "id": "wp-51701", "slug": "shrink-emissions-not-the-economy", "content": { "toc": [], "body": [ { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "This is a guest post by ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Linus Mattauch", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-bold" }, { "children": [ { "text": "1", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-superscript" }, { "text": ", ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Alexander Radebach", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-bold" }, { "children": [ { "text": "2", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-superscript" }, { "text": ", ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Jan Siegmeier", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-bold" }, { "children": [ { "text": "2", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-superscript" }, { "text": ", and ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Simona Sulikova", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-bold" }, { "children": [ { "text": "1", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-superscript" }, { "text": ".", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "children": [ { "text": "1", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-superscript" }, { "text": "Institute for New Economic Thinking, Oxford Martin School, and Environmental Change Institute, School of Geography & the Environment. University of Oxford.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "children": [ { "text": "2", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-superscript" }, { "text": "Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change Berlin.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "Public debates on climate change frequently exhibit a misunderstanding \u2013 namely that decarbonisation of our economies necessarily conflicts with economic growth. Ironically, the proponents of this claim come from two antagonistic camps. On the one hand, there are those who believe that addressing climate change must take priority and that this requires an organised diminution of economic output (termed \u201cdegrowth\u201d). On the other hand, there are those who believe that economic growth and the social stability that comes with it should be prioritised: concerning oneself with climate policy should not be a priority if it impacts competitiveness.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "text": [ { "text": "The technological feasibility of decoupling emissions", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "type": "heading", "level": 2, "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "One key distinction to elucidate the debate is between the technological and the political feasibility of \u201cdecoupling\u201d of ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://owid.cloud/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions/", "children": [ { "text": "emissions", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": " from ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://owid.cloud/economic-growth", "children": [ { "text": "growth", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ". Decoupling can be relative (when rates of economic growth are higher than rates of emissions growth) or absolute (when emissions fall in absolute terms even as the economy continues to grow). A further question only indirectly related to climate change mitigation is whether human well-being itself can be decoupled from economic growth.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "This post focuses on the ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "technological feasibility", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": " of absolute decoupling. Any cogent claim about appropriate responses to environmental problems must start with a normative benchmark, which for climate change mitigation is provided by assessments of optimal technology deployment and demand restructuring. Whether or not the optimal mix of relevant technologies is politically feasible is a different question entirely, but the two must be distinguished clearly for coherent policy advice.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "Indeed much sophisticated modelling has been carried out to show that the transformation to carbon-free economies is technologically feasible.{ref}Clarke L., K. Jiang, K. Akimoto, M. Babiker, G. Blanford, K. Fisher-Vanden, J.-C. Hourcade, V. Krey, E. Kriegler, A. L\u00f6schel, D. McCollum, S. Paltsev, S. Rose, P.R. Shukla, M. Tavoni, B.C.C. van der Zwaan, and D.P. van Vuuren, 2014: Assessing Transformation Pathways. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schl\u00f6mer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. Available ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/", "children": [ { "text": "online", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ".{/ref} The 2014 IPCC Report on the Mitigation of Climate Change has assessed this relevant modelling and finds that on average scenarios limiting warming to 2\u00b0 C costs 0.06 percent of annual economic growth.{ref}Edenhofer et al. (2014).\u00a0IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.{/ref} This is a small number compared to projections that the world economy will continue to grow at 2 percent per year, although in the order of the costs of any other major political reform. Furthermore, a substantial part of decarbonisation of the European Economy by 2030 is ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "already ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": "economically cost-effective.{ref}IRENA (2018).\u00a0Renewable Energy Prospects for the European Union. Available ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://irena.org/publications/2018/Feb/Renewable-energy-prospects-for-the-EU", "children": [ { "text": "online", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ".{/ref}", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "Global decoupling is not yet happening: Although annual global emissions have been stable in 2014-2016, they rose again in 2017.{ref}Jackson et al. (2017). ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=10.1088%2F1748-9326%2Faa9662&btnG=", "children": [ { "text": "Warning Signs for Stabilising global CO", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "2", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-subscript" }, { "text": " emissions", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ".{/ref} However, it would be premature to draw conclusions about the future based on past trends.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "text": [ { "text": "Emission-intensive sectors are only a minor part of the economy", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "type": "heading", "level": 2, "parseErrors": [] }, { "left": [ { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "As shown in the charts here, our data{ref}World Input-Output Database 2013 release [Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, E., Los, B., Stehrer, R. and de Vries, G. J. (2015),\"An Illustrated User Guide to the World Input\u2013Output Database: the Case of Global Automotive Production\", Review of International Economics., 23: 575\u2013605]. Year 2009 in basic prices, value added computed as net sectoral output (gross sectoral output less sectoral input).{/ref} illustrates one major reason behind the modelling consensus that decarbonisation and economic growth are compatible: in rich countries, sectors contributing most to economic output typically do not contribute to emissions significantly. This is true across such diverse economies as the United States, Germany, and China. Further, as we show in the next section, in many sectors absolute decoupling has been happening.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] } ], "type": "sticky-right", "right": [ { "url": "https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-usa", "type": "chart", "parseErrors": [] }, { "url": "https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-germany", "type": "chart", "parseErrors": [] }, { "url": "https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-china", "type": "chart", "parseErrors": [] } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "text": [ { "text": "Absolute decoupling has been happening in many economic sectors", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "type": "heading", "level": 2, "parseErrors": [] }, { "left": [ { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "So if the most powerful economic sectors are not emissions intensive, then regulating emissions need not affect economic prosperity or output in developed economies. As shown in the charts here, the virtual economy and high-skilled jobs have grown disproportionately faster than heavy industry in the recent past.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "Even in China, the service sector has grown from contributing 24% to total economic output in 1995 to 33% in 2009, when most of the emissions \u201cexported\u201d from high to lower-income countries went to Chinese manufacturing. In the United States the service sector contribution has increased from 52% to 58% and in Germany from 50% to 55%. This growth in services has arisen mostly at the expense of heavy industry (which fell from 17.5% to 14.7% and 27% to 23%, in the USA and Germany, respectively), in addition to a fall in China's agricultural contribution. This is particularly notable in China, a country to which polluting industry has often been exported; the vast majority of all sectors have experienced much faster growth in economic output than in emissions. Thus, relative decoupling is a technical feasibility.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "On the other hand, the charts in the previous section show that the sector that contributes by far the most emissions is energy and electricity generation. In Germany in 2009 it accounted for 51% of emissions and less than 3% of value added. Decarbonisation of the energy sector would thus contribute greatly to the decarbonisation of the economy without significantly affecting overall economic output, as a first approximation. Clearly, supply chains connect the growth and size of economic sectors. For instance, the digital economy requires a notable amount of electricity and material infrastructure. Yet, decarbonising the supplying sectors allows economic growth of the whole sectoral chain without a parallel growth in emissions.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] } ], "type": "sticky-right", "right": [ { "url": "https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-usa", "type": "chart", "parseErrors": [] }, { "url": "https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-germany", "type": "chart", "parseErrors": [] }, { "url": "https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-china", "type": "chart", "parseErrors": [] } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "text": [ { "text": "The three main arguments why growth and decarbonisation are compatible", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "type": "heading", "level": 2, "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "However, is this argument about the separation of economically important and emission-intensive sectors na\u00efve?\u00a0 After all, in the past, sustained economic growth has always coincided with growth in emissions. This objection is intuitive, but equates a correlation from a time with little political effort in climate protection with causation. We next revisit the main conceptual arguments behind why modelling consistently shows decarbonisation and economic growth are compatible under optimal policy.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "Beyond our simple plots that disentangle value added and emissions by sector, three further arguments make the equivalence of economic output growth and increasing emissions implausible.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "First, the fast development and high deployment of renewable energy technologies has brought down their production costs so far that for the first time, deploying solar and wind renewables is cheaper, on a life-cycle cost basis, than building fossil power stations.{ref}See Lazard's ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-2017/", "children": [ { "text": "Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE)", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": " Analysis, and Creutzig et al. (2017). The underestimated potential of solar energy to mitigate climate change.\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Nature", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": " Energy, ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "2", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-bold" }, { "text": ". Available ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://www.nature.com/articles/nenergy2017140", "children": [ { "text": "online", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ".{/ref}", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "Second, economies have been remarkably reactive to price signals and easily overcame substantial constraints in the past.{ref}See, for example, Beckert, S. (2004). Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War.\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "The American Historical Review,", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "children": [ { "text": "109", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": "(5), 1405-1438. Available ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/530931?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents", "children": [ { "text": "online", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ".{/ref} As resources become scarcer and prices increase, opportunities for substitutes arise. On an individual level, substantial price changes, even on fuel, do reduce demand.{ref}Zimmer, A., & Koch, N. (2017). Fuel consumption dynamics in Europe: Tax reform implications for air pollution and carbon emissions.\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": ",\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "106", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": ", 22-50. Available ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856416307650", "children": [ { "text": "online", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ".{/ref} One can thus be optimistic about the development of low-carbon production technologies if substantial carbon prices are put in place. Historically, higher rates of economic growth have also been correlated with higher rates of innovation.{ref}Hasan, I., & Tucci, C. L. (2010). The innovation\u2013economic growth nexus: Global evidence.\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Research Policy", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": ",\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "39", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": "(10), 1264-1276. Available online.{/ref}", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "Third, low-carbon substitutes for some goods are indeed difficult to conceive at the timescales required to successfully address the ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php", "children": [ { "text": "world's climate targets", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ", including reaching carbon neutrality within the 21", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "st", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-superscript" }, { "text": " century. ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://owid.cloud/meat-production", "children": [ { "text": "Meat consumption", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": " and aviation are highly emissions-intensive activities for which this is a case in point\u00a0\u2014 'artificial meat' and 'electric planes' may take too long to become marketable to achieve these goals. However, as ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "/shrink-emissions-not-the-economy#emission-intensive-sectors-are-only-a-minor-part-of-the-economy", "children": [ { "text": "we showed above", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ", these sectors are relatively small in terms of value added in developed economies. Therefore, reducing meat consumption and air transport, albeit partly controversial, should be feasible without large economic losses. One might go even further and question the interlinkage of consumption levels from these goods/services and societal well-being.{ref}Creutzig, F., Roy, J., Lamb, J. W. F., Azevedo, I. M. L., Bruine de Bruin, W., Dalkmann, H., Edelenbosch, O. Y., Geels, F.W., Grubler, A., Hepburn, C., Hertwich, E.G., Khosla, R., Mattauch, L.,Minx, J.C., Ramakrishnan, A., Rao, N.D., Steinberger, J.K.,Tavoni, M., \u00dcrge-Vorsatz, D. and Weber, E.U. (2018). Towards demand-side solutions for mitigating climate change.\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Nature Climate Change", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": "\u00a08: 268-271. Available ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0121-1", "children": [ { "text": "online", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ".{/ref} However, the last point raises intricate questions about what really matters for quality of life and what the 'good' society looks like.{ref}Mattauch, L., Ridgway, M., & Creutzig, F. (2016). Happy or liberal? Making sense of behavior in transport policy design.\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Transportation research part D: transport and environment", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": ",\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "45", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": ", 64-83. Available online.{/ref}", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": ",\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-superscript" }, { "text": "{ref}Mattauch, L., & Hepburn, C. (2016). Climate policy when preferences are endogenous\u2014and sometimes they are.\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Midwest Studies in Philosophy", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": ",\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "40", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": "(1), 76-95. Available online.{/ref}", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "These arguments have a significant implication for what governments should focus on in order to tackle climate change: curtail emissions in the highly emitting sectors! This can be achieved by levying a significant and reliable price on anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions \u2013 either through a tax or an emissions trading scheme. It will imply that appropriate low-carbon alternatives are developed. If done well, this can even increase productivity and create additional economic growth, as a ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk/news/good-climate-policy", "children": [ { "text": "recent article", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": " shows: aggregate investment is channeled from fossil resources into additional productive capital.{ref}Siegmeier, J., Mattauch, L., & Edenhofer, O. (2018). Capital beats coal: How collecting the climate rent increases aggregate investment.\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Journal of Environmental Economics and Management", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": ", 88: 366\u2014378. Available ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069617308707", "children": [ { "text": "online", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ".{/ref}", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "Alternatively, an outright ban on the most emissions-intensive economic activities, such as burning coal, would achieve equal results in terms of emissions reductions, but forgo some of the economic benefits of decarbonizing the economy by appropriate price signals. In countries in which strong mitigation policies are in place, such as Sweden and Switzerland, emissions are declining. It is true that a portion of these reductions may be attributed to carbon leakage \u2013 ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions#co2-emissions-and-prosperity", "children": [ { "text": "emissions are partly outsourced", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": " as ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://ourworldindata.org/growth-and-structural-transformation-are-emerging-economies-industrializing-too-quickly", "children": [ { "text": "production shifts", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": " to poorer or less environmentally regulated countries. Yet if just a limited number of countries decarbonise, carbon leakage is only an obstacle to emission reductions as long as national economies do not impose tariffs on the carbon content of products they import.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "text": [ { "text": "Individual responsibility and sufficiency", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "type": "heading", "level": 2, "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "While society at large has better alternatives to slowing growth, this is not necessarily true at the individual level. But what should an ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "individual\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": "do about climate change? While governments can target various sectors, consumers are limited to choose between already existing products. Information about emissions along the entire supply and production chain (including potential carbon leaks) are also typically lacking. Moreover, motivated individuals typically care about other dimensions of environmental sustainability, such as biodiversity and water use.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "Missing information and multiple objectives make product choice by individuals a different decision-making problem. Thus, at the private level, a more general sufficiency strategy of reducing material consumption overall may be appropriate.{ref}Wynes, S., & Nicholas, K. A. (2017). The climate mitigation gap: education and government recommendations miss the most effective individual actions.\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "Environmental Research Letters", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": ",\u00a0", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "children": [ { "text": "12", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-italic" }, { "text": "(7), 074024. Available ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7541", "children": [ { "text": "online", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "text": ".{/ref} Nonetheless, focusing on the most emissions-intensive activities such as road and air transport or meat consumption would make a certain contribution to climate change mitigation. Reducing material throughput is also strategy applicable at the economy-wide level; an example is the ", "spanType": "span-simple-text" }, { "url": "https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/towards-circular-economy_en", "children": [ { "text": "European Union Circular Economy policy", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-link" }, { "children": [ { "text": ".", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "spanType": "span-fallback" }, { "text": "\u00a0However, this has the purpose of creating innovation and redesigning waste contributing to energy efficiency.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] }, { "text": [ { "text": "Implications for climate policy", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "type": "heading", "level": 2, "parseErrors": [] }, { "type": "text", "value": [ { "text": "We conclude that contrasting climate protection with economic growth, as is so frequently done, is misleading. Economic growth emerges from individual instincts for improvements from billions of talented humans. Slowing down economic growth would mean suppressing that instinct, at enormous losses of individual freedom. So climate protection can only be successful by redirecting these instincts towards carbon-free production processes, creating a different sense of what is considered an improvement and, in rare cases, forgoing some benefits of irreplaceable high-carbon consumption options. Rather than emphasizing potential competitiveness concerns, debates about climate policy should focus on implementability of policy, political will and responsibility of actors, including private individuals.", "spanType": "span-simple-text" } ], "parseErrors": [] } ], "type": "article", "title": "Shrink emissions, not the economy", "authors": [ "Guest Authors" ], "dateline": "March 25, 2018", "sidebar-toc": false, "featured-image": "value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-usa-1.png" }, "createdAt": "2022-06-03T21:20:39.000Z", "published": false, "updatedAt": "2023-03-11T12:39:39.000Z", "revisionId": null, "publishedAt": "2018-03-25T20:35:00.000Z", "relatedCharts": [], "publicationContext": "listed" } |
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2018-03-25 20:35:00 | 2024-02-16 14:22:47 | 14njaJuIyfkr6o2s2SWCVZwrgClCkawnOsEtQSn4cNyo | [ "Guest Authors" ] |
2022-06-03 21:20:39 | 2023-03-11 12:39:39 | https://ourworldindata.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-usa-1.png | {} |
This is a guest post by **Linus Mattauch**1, **Alexander Radebach**2, **Jan Siegmeier**2, and **Simona Sulikova**1. 1Institute for New Economic Thinking, Oxford Martin School, and Environmental Change Institute, School of Geography & the Environment. University of Oxford. 2Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change Berlin. Public debates on climate change frequently exhibit a misunderstanding – namely that decarbonisation of our economies necessarily conflicts with economic growth. Ironically, the proponents of this claim come from two antagonistic camps. On the one hand, there are those who believe that addressing climate change must take priority and that this requires an organised diminution of economic output (termed “degrowth”). On the other hand, there are those who believe that economic growth and the social stability that comes with it should be prioritised: concerning oneself with climate policy should not be a priority if it impacts competitiveness. ## The technological feasibility of decoupling emissions One key distinction to elucidate the debate is between the technological and the political feasibility of “decoupling” of [emissions](https://owid.cloud/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions/) from [growth](https://owid.cloud/economic-growth). Decoupling can be relative (when rates of economic growth are higher than rates of emissions growth) or absolute (when emissions fall in absolute terms even as the economy continues to grow). A further question only indirectly related to climate change mitigation is whether human well-being itself can be decoupled from economic growth. This post focuses on the _technological feasibility_ of absolute decoupling. Any cogent claim about appropriate responses to environmental problems must start with a normative benchmark, which for climate change mitigation is provided by assessments of optimal technology deployment and demand restructuring. Whether or not the optimal mix of relevant technologies is politically feasible is a different question entirely, but the two must be distinguished clearly for coherent policy advice. Indeed much sophisticated modelling has been carried out to show that the transformation to carbon-free economies is technologically feasible.{ref}Clarke L., K. Jiang, K. Akimoto, M. Babiker, G. Blanford, K. Fisher-Vanden, J.-C. Hourcade, V. Krey, E. Kriegler, A. Löschel, D. McCollum, S. Paltsev, S. Rose, P.R. Shukla, M. Tavoni, B.C.C. van der Zwaan, and D.P. van Vuuren, 2014: Assessing Transformation Pathways. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. Available [online](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/).{/ref} The 2014 IPCC Report on the Mitigation of Climate Change has assessed this relevant modelling and finds that on average scenarios limiting warming to 2° C costs 0.06 percent of annual economic growth.{ref}Edenhofer et al. (2014). IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.{/ref} This is a small number compared to projections that the world economy will continue to grow at 2 percent per year, although in the order of the costs of any other major political reform. Furthermore, a substantial part of decarbonisation of the European Economy by 2030 is _already _economically cost-effective.{ref}IRENA (2018). Renewable Energy Prospects for the European Union. Available [online](https://irena.org/publications/2018/Feb/Renewable-energy-prospects-for-the-EU).{/ref} Global decoupling is not yet happening: Although annual global emissions have been stable in 2014-2016, they rose again in 2017.{ref}Jackson et al. (2017). [Warning Signs for Stabilising global CO2 emissions](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=10.1088%2F1748-9326%2Faa9662&btnG=).{/ref} However, it would be premature to draw conclusions about the future based on past trends. ## Emission-intensive sectors are only a minor part of the economy As shown in the charts here, our data{ref}World Input-Output Database 2013 release [Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, E., Los, B., Stehrer, R. and de Vries, G. J. (2015),"An Illustrated User Guide to the World Input–Output Database: the Case of Global Automotive Production", Review of International Economics., 23: 575–605]. Year 2009 in basic prices, value added computed as net sectoral output (gross sectoral output less sectoral input).{/ref} illustrates one major reason behind the modelling consensus that decarbonisation and economic growth are compatible: in rich countries, sectors contributing most to economic output typically do not contribute to emissions significantly. This is true across such diverse economies as the United States, Germany, and China. Further, as we show in the next section, in many sectors absolute decoupling has been happening. <Chart url="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-usa"/> <Chart url="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-germany"/> <Chart url="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-china"/> ## Absolute decoupling has been happening in many economic sectors So if the most powerful economic sectors are not emissions intensive, then regulating emissions need not affect economic prosperity or output in developed economies. As shown in the charts here, the virtual economy and high-skilled jobs have grown disproportionately faster than heavy industry in the recent past. Even in China, the service sector has grown from contributing 24% to total economic output in 1995 to 33% in 2009, when most of the emissions “exported” from high to lower-income countries went to Chinese manufacturing. In the United States the service sector contribution has increased from 52% to 58% and in Germany from 50% to 55%. This growth in services has arisen mostly at the expense of heavy industry (which fell from 17.5% to 14.7% and 27% to 23%, in the USA and Germany, respectively), in addition to a fall in China's agricultural contribution. This is particularly notable in China, a country to which polluting industry has often been exported; the vast majority of all sectors have experienced much faster growth in economic output than in emissions. Thus, relative decoupling is a technical feasibility. On the other hand, the charts in the previous section show that the sector that contributes by far the most emissions is energy and electricity generation. In Germany in 2009 it accounted for 51% of emissions and less than 3% of value added. Decarbonisation of the energy sector would thus contribute greatly to the decarbonisation of the economy without significantly affecting overall economic output, as a first approximation. Clearly, supply chains connect the growth and size of economic sectors. For instance, the digital economy requires a notable amount of electricity and material infrastructure. Yet, decarbonising the supplying sectors allows economic growth of the whole sectoral chain without a parallel growth in emissions. <Chart url="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-usa"/> <Chart url="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-germany"/> <Chart url="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-china"/> ## The three main arguments why growth and decarbonisation are compatible However, is this argument about the separation of economically important and emission-intensive sectors naïve? After all, in the past, sustained economic growth has always coincided with growth in emissions. This objection is intuitive, but equates a correlation from a time with little political effort in climate protection with causation. We next revisit the main conceptual arguments behind why modelling consistently shows decarbonisation and economic growth are compatible under optimal policy. Beyond our simple plots that disentangle value added and emissions by sector, three further arguments make the equivalence of economic output growth and increasing emissions implausible. First, the fast development and high deployment of renewable energy technologies has brought down their production costs so far that for the first time, deploying solar and wind renewables is cheaper, on a life-cycle cost basis, than building fossil power stations.{ref}See Lazard's [Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE)](https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-2017/) Analysis, and Creutzig et al. (2017). The underestimated potential of solar energy to mitigate climate change. _Nature_ Energy, **2**. Available [online](https://www.nature.com/articles/nenergy2017140).{/ref} Second, economies have been remarkably reactive to price signals and easily overcame substantial constraints in the past.{ref}See, for example, Beckert, S. (2004). Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War. _The American Historical Review,__109_(5), 1405-1438. Available [online](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/530931?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).{/ref} As resources become scarcer and prices increase, opportunities for substitutes arise. On an individual level, substantial price changes, even on fuel, do reduce demand.{ref}Zimmer, A., & Koch, N. (2017). Fuel consumption dynamics in Europe: Tax reform implications for air pollution and carbon emissions. _Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice_, _106_, 22-50. Available [online](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856416307650).{/ref} One can thus be optimistic about the development of low-carbon production technologies if substantial carbon prices are put in place. Historically, higher rates of economic growth have also been correlated with higher rates of innovation.{ref}Hasan, I., & Tucci, C. L. (2010). The innovation–economic growth nexus: Global evidence. _Research Policy_, _39_(10), 1264-1276. Available online.{/ref} Third, low-carbon substitutes for some goods are indeed difficult to conceive at the timescales required to successfully address the [world's climate targets](http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php), including reaching carbon neutrality within the 21st century. [Meat consumption](https://owid.cloud/meat-production) and aviation are highly emissions-intensive activities for which this is a case in point — 'artificial meat' and 'electric planes' may take too long to become marketable to achieve these goals. However, as [we showed above](/shrink-emissions-not-the-economy#emission-intensive-sectors-are-only-a-minor-part-of-the-economy), these sectors are relatively small in terms of value added in developed economies. Therefore, reducing meat consumption and air transport, albeit partly controversial, should be feasible without large economic losses. One might go even further and question the interlinkage of consumption levels from these goods/services and societal well-being.{ref}Creutzig, F., Roy, J., Lamb, J. W. F., Azevedo, I. M. L., Bruine de Bruin, W., Dalkmann, H., Edelenbosch, O. Y., Geels, F.W., Grubler, A., Hepburn, C., Hertwich, E.G., Khosla, R., Mattauch, L.,Minx, J.C., Ramakrishnan, A., Rao, N.D., Steinberger, J.K.,Tavoni, M., Ürge-Vorsatz, D. and Weber, E.U. (2018). Towards demand-side solutions for mitigating climate change. _Nature Climate Change_ 8: 268-271. Available [online](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0121-1).{/ref} However, the last point raises intricate questions about what really matters for quality of life and what the 'good' society looks like.{ref}Mattauch, L., Ridgway, M., & Creutzig, F. (2016). Happy or liberal? Making sense of behavior in transport policy design. _Transportation research part D: transport and environment_, _45_, 64-83. Available online.{/ref}, {ref}Mattauch, L., & Hepburn, C. (2016). Climate policy when preferences are endogenous—and sometimes they are. _Midwest Studies in Philosophy_, _40_(1), 76-95. Available online.{/ref} These arguments have a significant implication for what governments should focus on in order to tackle climate change: curtail emissions in the highly emitting sectors! This can be achieved by levying a significant and reliable price on anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions – either through a tax or an emissions trading scheme. It will imply that appropriate low-carbon alternatives are developed. If done well, this can even increase productivity and create additional economic growth, as a [recent article](https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk/news/good-climate-policy) shows: aggregate investment is channeled from fossil resources into additional productive capital.{ref}Siegmeier, J., Mattauch, L., & Edenhofer, O. (2018). Capital beats coal: How collecting the climate rent increases aggregate investment. _Journal of Environmental Economics and Management_, 88: 366—378. Available [online](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069617308707).{/ref} Alternatively, an outright ban on the most emissions-intensive economic activities, such as burning coal, would achieve equal results in terms of emissions reductions, but forgo some of the economic benefits of decarbonizing the economy by appropriate price signals. In countries in which strong mitigation policies are in place, such as Sweden and Switzerland, emissions are declining. It is true that a portion of these reductions may be attributed to carbon leakage – [emissions are partly outsourced](https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions#co2-emissions-and-prosperity) as [production shifts](https://ourworldindata.org/growth-and-structural-transformation-are-emerging-economies-industrializing-too-quickly) to poorer or less environmentally regulated countries. Yet if just a limited number of countries decarbonise, carbon leakage is only an obstacle to emission reductions as long as national economies do not impose tariffs on the carbon content of products they import. ## Individual responsibility and sufficiency While society at large has better alternatives to slowing growth, this is not necessarily true at the individual level. But what should an _individual _do about climate change? While governments can target various sectors, consumers are limited to choose between already existing products. Information about emissions along the entire supply and production chain (including potential carbon leaks) are also typically lacking. Moreover, motivated individuals typically care about other dimensions of environmental sustainability, such as biodiversity and water use. Missing information and multiple objectives make product choice by individuals a different decision-making problem. Thus, at the private level, a more general sufficiency strategy of reducing material consumption overall may be appropriate.{ref}Wynes, S., & Nicholas, K. A. (2017). The climate mitigation gap: education and government recommendations miss the most effective individual actions. _Environmental Research Letters_, _12_(7), 074024. Available [online](http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7541).{/ref} Nonetheless, focusing on the most emissions-intensive activities such as road and air transport or meat consumption would make a certain contribution to climate change mitigation. Reducing material throughput is also strategy applicable at the economy-wide level; an example is the [European Union Circular Economy policy](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/towards-circular-economy_en). However, this has the purpose of creating innovation and redesigning waste contributing to energy efficiency. ## Implications for climate policy We conclude that contrasting climate protection with economic growth, as is so frequently done, is misleading. Economic growth emerges from individual instincts for improvements from billions of talented humans. Slowing down economic growth would mean suppressing that instinct, at enormous losses of individual freedom. So climate protection can only be successful by redirecting these instincts towards carbon-free production processes, creating a different sense of what is considered an improvement and, in rare cases, forgoing some benefits of irreplaceable high-carbon consumption options. Rather than emphasizing potential competitiveness concerns, debates about climate policy should focus on implementability of policy, political will and responsibility of actors, including private individuals. | { "id": 51701, "date": "2018-03-25T21:35:00", "guid": { "rendered": "https://owid.cloud/?p=51701" }, "link": "https://owid.cloud/shrink-emissions-not-the-economy", "meta": { "owid_publication_context_meta_field": { "latest": true, "homepage": true, "immediate_newsletter": true } }, "slug": "shrink-emissions-not-the-economy", "tags": [], "type": "post", "title": { "rendered": "Shrink emissions, not the economy" }, "_links": { "self": [ { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/51701" } ], "about": [ { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/types/post" } ], "author": [ { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/users/28", "embeddable": true } ], "curies": [ { "href": "https://api.w.org/{rel}", "name": "wp", "templated": true } ], "replies": [ { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/comments?post=51701", "embeddable": true } ], "wp:term": [ { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/categories?post=51701", "taxonomy": "category", "embeddable": true }, { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/tags?post=51701", "taxonomy": "post_tag", "embeddable": true } ], "collection": [ { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/posts" } ], "wp:attachment": [ { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/media?parent=51701" } ], "version-history": [ { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/51701/revisions", "count": 23 } ], "wp:featuredmedia": [ { "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/media/51767", "embeddable": true } ], "predecessor-version": [ { "id": 56213, "href": "https://owid.cloud/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/51701/revisions/56213" } ] }, "author": 28, "format": "standard", "status": "publish", "sticky": false, "content": { "rendered": "\t<div class=\"wp-block-owid-byline\">\n\t\t\n\n<p>This is a guest post by <strong>Linus Mattauch</strong><sup>1</sup>, <strong>Alexander Radebach</strong><sup>2</sup>, <strong>Jan Siegmeier</strong><sup>2</sup>, and <strong>Simona Sulikova</strong><sup>1</sup>.</p>\n\n\n\n<p><sup>1</sup>Institute for New Economic Thinking, Oxford Martin School, and Environmental Change Institute, School of Geography & the Environment. University of Oxford.</p>\n\n\n\n<p><sup>2</sup>Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change Berlin.</p>\n\n\n\t</div>\n\n\n<p>Public debates on climate change frequently exhibit a misunderstanding \u2013 namely that decarbonisation of our economies necessarily conflicts with economic growth. Ironically, the proponents of this claim come from two antagonistic camps. On the one hand, there are those who believe that addressing climate change must take priority and that this requires an organised diminution of economic output (termed \u201cdegrowth\u201d). On the other hand, there are those who believe that economic growth and the social stability that comes with it should be prioritised: concerning oneself with climate policy should not be a priority if it impacts competitiveness.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4>The technological feasibility of decoupling emissions</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>One key distinction to elucidate the debate is between the technological and the political feasibility of \u201cdecoupling\u201d of <a href=\"https://owid.cloud/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">emissions</a> from <a href=\"https://owid.cloud/economic-growth\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">growth</a>. Decoupling can be relative (when rates of economic growth are higher than rates of emissions growth) or absolute (when emissions fall in absolute terms even as the economy continues to grow). A further question only indirectly related to climate change mitigation is whether human well-being itself can be decoupled from economic growth.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>This post focuses on the <em>technological feasibility</em> of absolute decoupling. Any cogent claim about appropriate responses to environmental problems must start with a normative benchmark, which for climate change mitigation is provided by assessments of optimal technology deployment and demand restructuring. Whether or not the optimal mix of relevant technologies is politically feasible is a different question entirely, but the two must be distinguished clearly for coherent policy advice.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed much sophisticated modelling has been carried out to show that the transformation to carbon-free economies is technologically feasible.{ref}Clarke L., K. Jiang, K. Akimoto, M. Babiker, G. Blanford, K. Fisher-Vanden, J.-C. Hourcade, V. Krey, E. Kriegler, A. L\u00f6schel, D. McCollum, S. Paltsev, S. Rose, P.R. Shukla, M. Tavoni, B.C.C. van der Zwaan, and D.P. van Vuuren, 2014: Assessing Transformation Pathways. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schl\u00f6mer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. Available <a href=\"https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">online</a>.{/ref} The 2014 IPCC Report on the Mitigation of Climate Change has assessed this relevant modelling and finds that on average scenarios limiting warming to 2\u00b0 C costs 0.06 percent of annual economic growth.{ref}Edenhofer et al. (2014). IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.{/ref} This is a small number compared to projections that the world economy will continue to grow at 2 percent per year, although in the order of the costs of any other major political reform. Furthermore, a substantial part of decarbonisation of the European Economy by 2030 is <em>already </em>economically cost-effective.{ref}IRENA (2018). Renewable Energy Prospects for the European Union. Available <a href=\"https://irena.org/publications/2018/Feb/Renewable-energy-prospects-for-the-EU\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">online</a>.{/ref}</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Global decoupling is not yet happening: Although annual global emissions have been stable in 2014-2016, they rose again in 2017.{ref}Jackson et al. (2017). <a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=10.1088%2F1748-9326%2Faa9662&btnG=\" target=\"_blank\">Warning Signs for Stabilising global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions</a>.{/ref} However, it would be premature to draw conclusions about the future based on past trends.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4>Emission-intensive sectors are only a minor part of the economy</h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-columns\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column\">\n<p>As shown in the charts here, our data{ref}World Input-Output Database 2013 release [Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, E., Los, B., Stehrer, R. and de Vries, G. J. (2015),”An Illustrated User Guide to the World Input\u2013Output Database: the Case of Global Automotive Production”, Review of International Economics., 23: 575\u2013605]. Year 2009 in basic prices, value added computed as net sectoral output (gross sectoral output less sectoral input).{/ref} illustrates one major reason behind the modelling consensus that decarbonisation and economic growth are compatible: in rich countries, sectors contributing most to economic output typically do not contribute to emissions significantly. This is true across such diverse economies as the United States, Germany, and China. Further, as we show in the next section, in many sectors absolute decoupling has been happening.</p>\n</div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-column\">\n<figure><iframe loading=\"lazy\" style=\"width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;\" src=\"https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-usa\" width=\"300\" height=\"150\"></iframe></figure>\n\n\n\n<figure><iframe loading=\"lazy\" style=\"width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;\" src=\"https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-germany\" width=\"300\" height=\"150\"></iframe></figure>\n\n\n\n<figure><iframe loading=\"lazy\" style=\"width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;\" src=\"https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-china\" width=\"300\" height=\"150\"></iframe></figure>\n</div>\n</div>\n\n\n\n<h4>Absolute decoupling has been happening in many economic sectors</h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-columns\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column\">\n<p>So if the most powerful economic sectors are not emissions intensive, then regulating emissions need not affect economic prosperity or output in developed economies. As shown in the charts here, the virtual economy and high-skilled jobs have grown disproportionately faster than heavy industry in the recent past.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Even in China, the service sector has grown from contributing 24% to total economic output in 1995 to 33% in 2009, when most of the emissions \u201cexported\u201d from high to lower-income countries went to Chinese manufacturing. In the United States the service sector contribution has increased from 52% to 58% and in Germany from 50% to 55%. This growth in services has arisen mostly at the expense of heavy industry (which fell from 17.5% to 14.7% and 27% to 23%, in the USA and Germany, respectively), in addition to a fall in China’s agricultural contribution. This is particularly notable in China, a country to which polluting industry has often been exported; the vast majority of all sectors have experienced much faster growth in economic output than in emissions. Thus, relative decoupling is a technical feasibility.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>On the other hand, the charts in the previous section show that the sector that contributes by far the most emissions is energy and electricity generation. In Germany in 2009 it accounted for 51% of emissions and less than 3% of value added. Decarbonisation of the energy sector would thus contribute greatly to the decarbonisation of the economy without significantly affecting overall economic output, as a first approximation. Clearly, supply chains connect the growth and size of economic sectors. For instance, the digital economy requires a notable amount of electricity and material infrastructure. Yet, decarbonising the supplying sectors allows economic growth of the whole sectoral chain without a parallel growth in emissions.</p>\n</div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-column\">\n<figure><iframe loading=\"lazy\" style=\"width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;\" src=\"https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-usa\" width=\"300\" height=\"150\"></iframe></figure>\n\n\n\n<figure><iframe loading=\"lazy\" style=\"width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;\" src=\"https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-germany\" width=\"300\" height=\"150\"></iframe></figure>\n\n\n\n<figure><iframe loading=\"lazy\" style=\"width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;\" src=\"https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/value-added-growth-vs-emissions-growth-china\" width=\"300\" height=\"150\"></iframe></figure>\n</div>\n</div>\n\n\n\n<h4>The three main arguments why growth and decarbonisation are compatible</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>However, is this argument about the separation of economically important and emission-intensive sectors na\u00efve? After all, in the past, sustained economic growth has always coincided with growth in emissions. This objection is intuitive, but equates a correlation from a time with little political effort in climate protection with causation. We next revisit the main conceptual arguments behind why modelling consistently shows decarbonisation and economic growth are compatible under optimal policy.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Beyond our simple plots that disentangle value added and emissions by sector, three further arguments make the equivalence of economic output growth and increasing emissions implausible.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>First, the fast development and high deployment of renewable energy technologies has brought down their production costs so far that for the first time, deploying solar and wind renewables is cheaper, on a life-cycle cost basis, than building fossil power stations.{ref}See Lazard’s <a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-2017/\" target=\"_blank\">Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE)</a> Analysis, and Creutzig et al. (2017). The underestimated potential of solar energy to mitigate climate change. <em>Nature</em> Energy, <strong>2</strong>. Available <a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https://www.nature.com/articles/nenergy2017140\" target=\"_blank\">online</a>.{/ref}</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Second, economies have been remarkably reactive to price signals and easily overcame substantial constraints in the past.{ref}See, for example, Beckert, S. (2004). Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War. <i>The American Historical Review,</i> <i>109</i>(5), 1405-1438. Available <a href=\"http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/530931?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">online</a>.{/ref} As resources become scarcer and prices increase, opportunities for substitutes arise. On an individual level, substantial price changes, even on fuel, do reduce demand.{ref}Zimmer, A., & Koch, N. (2017). Fuel consumption dynamics in Europe: Tax reform implications for air pollution and carbon emissions. <i>Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice</i>, <i>106</i>, 22-50. Available <a href=\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856416307650\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">online</a>.{/ref} One can thus be optimistic about the development of low-carbon production technologies if substantial carbon prices are put in place. Historically, higher rates of economic growth have also been correlated with higher rates of innovation.{ref}Hasan, I., & Tucci, C. L. (2010). The innovation\u2013economic growth nexus: Global evidence. <i>Research Policy</i>, <i>39</i>(10), 1264-1276. Available online.{/ref}</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Third, low-carbon substitutes for some goods are indeed difficult to conceive at the timescales required to successfully address the <a rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" href=\"http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php\" target=\"_blank\">world’s climate targets</a>, including reaching carbon neutrality within the 21<sup>st</sup> century. <a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https://owid.cloud/meat-production\" data-type=\"page\" data-id=\"13015\" target=\"_blank\">Meat consumption</a> and aviation are highly emissions-intensive activities for which this is a case in point \u2014 ‘artificial meat’ and ‘electric planes’ may take too long to become marketable to achieve these goals. However, as <a href=\"/shrink-emissions-not-the-economy#emission-intensive-sectors-are-only-a-minor-part-of-the-economy\" data-type=\"internal\">we showed above</a>, these sectors are relatively small in terms of value added in developed economies. Therefore, reducing meat consumption and air transport, albeit partly controversial, should be feasible without large economic losses. One might go even further and question the interlinkage of consumption levels from these goods/services and societal well-being.{ref}Creutzig, F., Roy, J., Lamb, J. W. F., Azevedo, I. M. L., Bruine de Bruin, W., Dalkmann, H., Edelenbosch, O. Y., Geels, F.W., Grubler, A., Hepburn, C., Hertwich, E.G., Khosla, R., Mattauch, L.,Minx, J.C., Ramakrishnan, A., Rao, N.D., Steinberger, J.K.,Tavoni, M., \u00dcrge-Vorsatz, D. and Weber, E.U. (2018). Towards demand-side solutions for mitigating climate change. <i>Nature Climate Change</i> 8: 268-271. Available <a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0121-1\" target=\"_blank\">online</a>.{/ref} However, the last point raises intricate questions about what really matters for quality of life and what the ‘good’ society looks like.{ref}Mattauch, L., Ridgway, M., & Creutzig, F. (2016). Happy or liberal? Making sense of behavior in transport policy design. <i>Transportation research part D: transport and environment</i>, <i>45</i>, 64-83. Available online.{/ref}<sup>, </sup>{ref}Mattauch, L., & Hepburn, C. (2016). Climate policy when preferences are endogenous\u2014and sometimes they are. <i>Midwest Studies in Philosophy</i>, <i>40</i>(1), 76-95. Available online.{/ref}</p>\n\n\n\n<p>These arguments have a significant implication for what governments should focus on in order to tackle climate change: curtail emissions in the highly emitting sectors! This can be achieved by levying a significant and reliable price on anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions \u2013 either through a tax or an emissions trading scheme. It will imply that appropriate low-carbon alternatives are developed. If done well, this can even increase productivity and create additional economic growth, as a <a rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" href=\"https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk/news/good-climate-policy\" target=\"_blank\">recent article</a> shows: aggregate investment is channeled from fossil resources into additional productive capital.{ref}Siegmeier, J., Mattauch, L., & Edenhofer, O. (2018). Capital beats coal: How collecting the climate rent increases aggregate investment. <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>, 88: 366\u2014378. Available <a href=\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069617308707\">online</a>.{/ref}</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Alternatively, an outright ban on the most emissions-intensive economic activities, such as burning coal, would achieve equal results in terms of emissions reductions, but forgo some of the economic benefits of decarbonizing the economy by appropriate price signals. In countries in which strong mitigation policies are in place, such as Sweden and Switzerland, emissions are declining. It is true that a portion of these reductions may be attributed to carbon leakage \u2013 <a rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" href=\"https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions#co2-emissions-and-prosperity\" target=\"_blank\">emissions are partly outsourced</a> as <a rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" href=\"https://ourworldindata.org/growth-and-structural-transformation-are-emerging-economies-industrializing-too-quickly\" target=\"_blank\">production shifts</a> to poorer or less environmentally regulated countries. Yet if just a limited number of countries decarbonise, carbon leakage is only an obstacle to emission reductions as long as national economies do not impose tariffs on the carbon content of products they import.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4>Individual responsibility and sufficiency</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>While society at large has better alternatives to slowing growth, this is not necessarily true at the individual level. But what should an <em>individual </em>do about climate change? While governments can target various sectors, consumers are limited to choose between already existing products. Information about emissions along the entire supply and production chain (including potential carbon leaks) are also typically lacking. Moreover, motivated individuals typically care about other dimensions of environmental sustainability, such as biodiversity and water use.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Missing information and multiple objectives make product choice by individuals a different decision-making problem. Thus, at the private level, a more general sufficiency strategy of reducing material consumption overall may be appropriate.{ref}Wynes, S., & Nicholas, K. A. (2017). The climate mitigation gap: education and government recommendations miss the most effective individual actions. <i>Environmental Research Letters</i>, <i>12</i>(7), 074024. Available <a href=\"http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7541\">online</a>.{/ref} Nonetheless, focusing on the most emissions-intensive activities such as road and air transport or meat consumption would make a certain contribution to climate change mitigation. Reducing material throughput is also strategy applicable at the economy-wide level; an example is the <a rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" href=\"https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/towards-circular-economy_en\" target=\"_blank\">European Union Circular Economy policy</a><span style=\"font-size: 13.3333px;\">.</span> However, this has the purpose of creating innovation and redesigning waste contributing to energy efficiency.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4>Implications for climate policy</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>We conclude that contrasting climate protection with economic growth, as is so frequently done, is misleading. Economic growth emerges from individual instincts for improvements from billions of talented humans. Slowing down economic growth would mean suppressing that instinct, at enormous losses of individual freedom. So climate protection can only be successful by redirecting these instincts towards carbon-free production processes, creating a different sense of what is considered an improvement and, in rare cases, forgoing some benefits of irreplaceable high-carbon consumption options. Rather than emphasizing potential competitiveness concerns, debates about climate policy should focus on implementability of policy, political will and responsibility of actors, including private individuals.</p>\n", "protected": false }, "excerpt": { "rendered": "", "protected": false }, "date_gmt": "2018-03-25T20:35:00", "modified": "2023-03-11T12:39:39", "template": "", "categories": [ 1 ], "ping_status": "closed", "authors_name": [ "Guest Authors" ], "modified_gmt": "2023-03-11T12:39:39", "comment_status": "closed", "featured_media": 51767, "featured_media_paths": { "thumbnail": "/app/uploads/2018/03/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-usa-1-150x106.png", "medium_large": "/app/uploads/2018/03/value-added-vs-share-of-emissions-usa-1-768x542.png" } } |